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http://www.naturalnews.com/034229_science_cyborgs.html
IN A NUTSHELL, A BRIEF SUMMARY
1. I have been targeted by Tun Dr. Mahathir (former Prime Minister of Malaysia), my own father for trying to expose his lies to his own country, Malaysia and the world.
2. I have been a victim (and not the only one) of brainwave pattern reading and manipulation of undetermined origin either via microwave signals (microwave hearing) or other electronic harassment technologies with the same effect by his orders.
3. That these technologies do exist and have been in development for a long time by the former USSR and United States of America, and NOT as he stated, “Malaysia is the first country to develop a peaceful weapon as an example to the rest of the world”.
4. That this weapon is not “peaceful” but a method of intimidation and also a method to inflict mental torture (as I have experienced) a form of torture technique described in international law as being unlawful.
5. That he is a closeted Freemason and has been working with the very people he has been demonising.
6. That he and Anwar Ibrahim (also a Freemason) lied to the whole nation concerning their supposed ‘fallout’ and that it was a scheme to monopolize the local political environment (similar to the dual party system in the US and other countries) as a means of controlling public opinion and any eventual backlash via his proxy Anwar.
7. That Tun Mahathir betrayed and is a traitor to all the people who helped create the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal, because he is working with the very people he claims to be fighting against. That he has all along been working with the industrial military complex via his hidden support of British weapons dealers and makers and a user of these despicable weapons. That the tribunal was doomed to fail from the start because he had orchestrated it to be so.
8. That he lied to his countrymen and Muslims around the world about being a Muslim as a scheme to ‘infiltrate’ and influence the Muslim world and third world countries.
9. That he is a self-professed Atheist in private and does not believe in God, life after death, and angels/demons/jinns (he also drinks alcohol in private during family vacations overseas).
10. That he believes in Islam Allah SWT is referring to man and that he is Allah SWT. That since God is the Creator and man also creates, he is God.
11. That he claims to be Jesus Christ but then restated that he doesn’t believe that Prophet Isa or Jesus Christ ever existed because “there is no historical evidence that he ever existed”.
12. That what all the prophets experienced when they saw or where met by angels were mere “hallucinations” which according to him if people back then had knowledge of modern science would deem it a “medical condition” or “hallucinations”.
13. That when asked if he chose God over Satan, he casually said he chose Satan as god because he doesn’t believe that there is a God to punish him or a life after death to worry about.
14. That he considers himself to be a “gentleman”, and that “gentlemen are above the law”, and that “gentlemen always play dirty” (in response to my outrage of his attempts to silence me)
15. That my own father, Tun Dr. Mahathir has repeatedly threaten to kill me should I inform people of his true self and agendas to dissuade me from talking. He even said it could be made to look like an accident. He has also threatened to have me “disappear” or kidnapped.
16. That he is involved in a criminal enterprise and consider the police force and judicial system of Malaysia his toy, and even said that he could just bribe or give orders to judges and police officials should I report his criminal activities.
17. That he will ensure that I would not get any legal help as he could threaten or bribe any lawyers that would try to help me.
18. That he will convince people that I am delusional as there is no legal protocol in place to report the use of brainwave reading and harassment technologies which is hard to prove without the right scientific instruments and that he could terminate the signal thus rendering any proof of activity as non-existent (the reason why he chose this method or weapon).
19. That he will start a smear campaign against me should I ever divulge any of his secrets (which he has already started) as a pre-emptive measure.
20. That he has lied to his own wife; my mother, my family, Malaysians and the world.
http://baike.baidu.com/view/2173657.html?tp=1_11
嗅觉电影
◤嗅觉电影◢ 无论是烧烤大餐上令人垂涎的香味，女性令人陶醉的香水气味，还是战场上火药的硫磺气味，这些气味都具 有强大的力量。因此，科学家提出一种理念——在电视节目和游戏视频中的特殊画 面将伴随人们产生一定的嗅觉联想。 这种理念又被称为“嗅觉电影”，赋予电视画面让人体大脑产生相应的气味反应，我们仍不清楚为什么我们能够感觉到某些分子具有特殊的气味反应，因此并不能预测一种分子所有的气味，也无法制造特殊的分子形成独特的气味。然而，近期最新科技手段暗示着现已突破之前“嗅觉电影”的发展障碍，不久人们将能理解嗅觉感应是如何工作的，并且“嗅觉电影”也将成为现实！ 美国气味研究（DigiScents）公司在上世纪90年代研发出“嗅觉电影”技术，曾在该公司工作的嗅觉科学家艾弗里－吉尔伯特（Avery Gilbert）称，我们将气味分成了三十多种类型，比如：树木、草、排泄物、花卉等。气味研究公司建造了一种原型设备，可以产生许多日常生活中的气味。吉尔伯特称，这些气味不能完全复制，但却可以进行识别。 目前，银幕对于嗅觉电影概念并不陌生，自上世纪50年代就在银幕上出现了嗅觉电影的雏形，此后陆续出现了许多嗅觉电影。前不久，日本索尼公司最新专利产品可使用超声波信号直接刺激大脑部分，从而诱导浏览者或游戏者产生嗅觉反应 1960年小迈克尔·托德投资了这种嗅觉电影装置，这是一种复杂的系统，能让电影卷轴产生瓶装香水的气味，随影片情节传给观众。唯一一部使用嗅觉的电影是1960年的《》。这部影片是为这种装置特别创作的。不难想象，这部影片恶评不断，此后嗅觉电影也不再使用。
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg18624944.600
Sony Patent Takes First Step Towards Real-Life Matrix By Jenny Hogan & Barry Fox NewScientist.com 4-7-5 Imagine movies and computer games in which you get to smell, taste and perhaps even feel things. That's the tantalising prospect raised by a patent on a device for transmitting sensory data directly into the human brain - granted to none other than the entertainment giant Sony. The technique suggested in the patent is entirely non-invasive. It describes a device that fires pulses of ultrasound at the head to modify firing patterns in targeted parts of the brain, creating "sensory experiences" ranging from moving images to tastes and sounds. This could give blind or deaf people the chance to see or hear, the patent claims. While brain implants are becoming increasingly sophisticated, the only non-invasive ways of manipulating the brain remain crude. A technique known as transcranial magnetic stimulation can activate nerves by using rapidly changing magnetic fields to induce currents in brain tissue. However, magnetic fields cannot be finely focused on small groups of brain cells, whereas ultrasound could be. If the method described by Sony really does work, it could have all sorts of uses in research and medicine, even if it is not capable of evoking sensory experiences detailed enough for the entertainment purposes envisaged in the patent. Details are sparse, and Sony declined New Scientist's request for an interview with the inventor, who is based in its offices in San Diego, California. However, independent experts are not dismissing the idea out of hand. "I looked at it and found it plausible," says Niels Birbaumer, a pioneering neuroscientist at the University of T¸bingen in Germany who has created devices that let people control devices via brain waves. The application contains references to two scientific papers presenting research that could underpin the device. One, in an echo of Galvani's classic 18th-century experiments on frogs' legs that proved electricity can trigger nerve impulses, showed that certain kinds of ultrasound pulses can affect the excitability of nerves from a frog's leg. The author, Richard Mihran of the University of Colorado, Boulder, had no knowledge of the patent until New Scientist contacted him, but says he would be concerned about the proposed method's long-term safety. Sony first submitted a patent application for the ultrasound method in 2000, which was granted in March 2003. Since then Sony has filed a series of continuations, most recently in December 2004 (US 2004/267118). Elizabeth Boukis, spokeswoman for Sony Electronics, says the work is speculative. "There were not any experiments done," she says. "This particular patent was a prophetic invention. It was based on an inspiration that this may someday be the direction that technology will take us." - From issue 2494 of New Scientist magazine, 07 April 2005, page 10 © Copyright Reed Business Information Ltd.
http://science.dodlive.mil/2010/09/01/remote-control-of-brain-activity-using-ultrasound/
Dr. William J. Tyler is an Assistant Professor in the School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University, is a co-founder and the CSO of SynSonix, Inc., and a member of the 2010 DARPA Young Faculty Award class.
Every single aspect of human sensation, perception, emotion, and behavior is regulated by brain activity. Thus, having the ability to stimulate brain function is a powerful technology.
Recent advances in neurotechnology have shown that brain stimulation is capable of treating neurological diseases and brain injury, as well as serving platforms around which brain-computer interfaces can be built for various purposes. Several limitations however still pose significant challenges to implementing traditional brain stimulation methods for treating diseases and controlling information processing in brain circuits.
For example, deep-brain stimulating (DBS) electrodes used to treat movement disorders such as Parkinson’s disease require neurosurgery in order to implant electrodes and batteries into patients. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) used to treat drug-resistant depression and other disorders do not require surgery, but have a low spatial resolution of approximately one centimeter and cannot stimulate deep brain circuits where many diseased circuits reside.
These illustrations show the surgical invasiveness of deep-brain stimulating electrodes (left) and depict the low spatial resolutions conferred by transcranial magnetic stimulation (right). (Image: Tyler Lab)
To overcome the above limitations, my laboratory has engineered a novel technology which implements transcranial pulsed ultrasound to remotely and directly stimulate brain circuits without requiring surgery. Further, we have shown this ultrasonic neuromodulation approach confers a spatial resolution approximately five times greater than TMS and can exert its effects upon subcortical brain circuits deep within the brain.
A portion of our initial work has been supported by the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) Army Research Laboratory (ARL) where we have been working to develop methods for encoding sensory data onto the cortex using pulsed ultrasound.
Through a recent grant made by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Young Faculty Award Program, our research will begin undergoing the next phases of research and development aimed towards engineering future applications using this neurotechnology for our country’s warfighters. Here, we will continue exploring the influence of ultrasound on brain function and begin using transducer phased arrays to examine the influence of focused ultrasound on intact brain circuits. We will also be investigating the use of capacitive micromachined ultrasonic transducers (CMUTs) for use in brain stimulation. Finally, to improve upon spatial resolution, we will examine the use of acoustic metamaterials and hyperlenses to study how subdiffraction limited ultrasound influences brain wave activity patterns.
How can this technology be used to provide our nation’s Warfighters with strategic advantages? We have developed working and conceptual prototypes in which ballistic helmets can be fitted with ultrasound transducers and microcontroller devices to illustrate potential applications as shown below. We look forward to developing a close working relationship with DARPA and other Department of Defense and U.S. Intelligence Communities to bring some of these applications to fruition over the coming years depending on the most pressing needs of our country’s defense industries.
Above illustrations show a ballistic helmet fitted with four ultrasound transducers (left) and another functional prototype for achieving human brain stimulation using a single element transducer (bottom-right), as well as a list of potential applications relevant to the defense industry. (Image: Tyler Lab)
http://www.laborlawtalk.com/showthread.php?t=103474&page=1
Plaintiff was microchipped by DEA for tracking purposes since 1996.
When plaintiff was taken custody by law enforcers, he was asked to sign
documents permitting authority to surgical removal of the chips.
Could be interesting to some of you.
(2002) Implanted Microchip Lawsuit
42. Defendants GAMMEL, FARLEY, ROBERTO, KELLY, PETERSON, DESMOND,
CUNIFF, SOILES, QUIGLEY and several JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, took part
in the arrest of Plaintiff stated in paragraphs number forty (40) and
forty-one (41) above.
43. While in the custody of agents, Plaintiff was approached by
Defendant ROBERTO, who attempted to gain Plaintiff's authorization and
signature on a document.
44. The document stated in paragraph forty-three (43) above was
purporting to be an "authorization" for the surgical removal of an
electronic device from Plaintiff's body.
45. Defendant [**9] ROBERTO, informed Plaintiff, that Plaintiff had
been implanted with an "a microchip tracking device" and law
enforcement (Drug Enforcement Agency/Federal Bureau Investigation) had
been tracing Plaintiff since on or about November 25, 1996.
46. Defendant ROBERTO, further stated to Plaintiff that it was on "on
loan" to Drug Enforcement Agency from the Central Intelligence Agency
(C.I.A.) and was a sophisticated state of the art piece of equipment,
cost a lot of money. Must be returned to the CIA.
47. Defendant ROBERTO, assured Plaintiff that he (Plaintiff) would be
released on bail if Plaintiff would [*249] sign documents and
consent to surgical removal of device.
48. Plaintiff refused to sign the consent forms. Defendant DESMOND
stated "Nobody will ever believe we did this".
49. Plaintiff was transported from Logan International Airport to the
Drug Enforcement Agency's New England Field Division Office (Field
Office) in Boston, Massachusetts.
50. While being transported from the Logan International Airport to
the field office, Defendant's FARLEY, and QUIGLEY, continued to entice
Plaintiff to consent to the surgical [**10] removal of the device.
++++++++++++++++++++++++
VINCENT MICHAEL MARINO, a/k/a Vincent Michael Portalla, Plaintiff v.
JOHN GAMMEL, FBI Agent, DAMIEN FARLEY, DEA Agent, ANTHONY ROBERTO, DEA
Agent, VINCENT KELLY, DEA Agent, NORMAN PETERSON, DEA Agent, JOSEPH
DESMOND, DEA Agent, MICHAEL CUNIFF, DEA Agent, JAMES SOILES, DEA,
Agent, THOMAS QUIGLEY, Massachusetts State Police, and JOHN AND JANE
DOES 1-20, Defendants
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-10116-REK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
191 F. Supp. 2d 243; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4471
March 5, 2002, Decided
DISPOSITION: Defendants' motions to dismiss were granted, in part.
Plaintiff's discovery motions were denied. Plaintiff's other motions
were denied or dismissed.
COUNSEL: [**1] VINCENT MICHAEL MARINO aka Vincent Michael Portalla,
Plaintiff, Pro se, Atlanta, GA.
For JOHN GAMMEL, FBI Agent, DAMIEN FARLEY, DEA Agent, ANTHONY ROBERTO,
DEA Agent, VINCENT KELLY, DEA Agent, JOSEPH DESMOND, DEA Agent,
MICHAEL CUNIFF, DEA Agent, JAMES SOILES, DEA Agent, THOMAS QUIGLEY,
Massachusetts State Police, JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-20, Defendants: Anita
Johnson, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA.
For THOMAS QUIGLEY, Massachusetts State Police, Defendant: Marini
Torres-Benson, Office of the Attorney General, Boston, MA.
JUDGES: Robert E. Keeton, United States District Judge.
OPINIONBY: Robert E. Keeton
OPINION: [*245] Memorandum and Order
March 5, 2002
I. Pending Matters
Pending for decision are the matters associated with the following
filings:
(1) Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 21, filed July
10, 2001), with accompanying memorandum in support (Docket No. 22,
filed July 10, 2001);
(2) Thomas Quigley's Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Docket No. 77, filed November 7, 2001), with accompanying
memorandum in support (Docket No. 18, filed June 12, 2001);
[*246] (3) Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
(Docket No. 50, filed November 2, 2001); [**2]
(4) Plaintiff's Motion for Disclosure and Production of Newly
Discovered Documents Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 26 and Rule 34 (Docket
No. 53, filed December 3, 2001);
(5) Plaintiff's Motion for Disclosure and Production of Newly
Discovered Documents Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 26 and Rule 34 (Docket
No. 56, filed December 6, 2001);
(6) Plaintiff's Motion to Clarify Medical Term Artifact (Docket No.
57, filed December 20, 2001);
(7) Plaintiff's Motion to Offer Caselaw to Prohibit Defense Attorneys
from Protection of Defendants who Continue to Conspire Together in
Furtherance of Conspiracy and Conspiracy of Silence to Cover Up
Discovery (Docket No. 59, filed January 7, 2002);
(8) Plaintiff's Notice via Sharing an Attorney with Original
Defendants and Also via Identify of Interest with Originally Named
Defendants (Docket No. 60, filed January 7, 2002);
(9) Plaintiff's Motion of Disclosure and Production of Newly
Discovered Documents re: United States Patent Number: 5,629,678 of
Human Implants of Tracking Devices and Other State of the Art
Capabilities, All Being Disclosed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26
and Rule 34 (Docket No. 61, filed January 7, 2002);
(10) Plaintiff's Response [**3] in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
(Docket No. 64, filed January 10, 2002);
(11) Plaintiff's Motion to Clarify Medical Term Artifact (Docket No.
62, filed January 10, 2002);
(12) Defendants' Reply to Marino's Opposition to Dismissal (Docket No.
71, filed January 24, 2002); and
(13) Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 72, filed
February 7, 2002), with accompanying memorandum in support (Docket No.
73, filed February 7, 2002);
(14) Plaintiff's Additional Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
Dismiss (Docket No. 75, filed February 19, 2002); and
(15) Plaintiff's Motion of Newly Discovered Evidence Offered Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26 and Rule 34 (Docket No. 76, filed February
19, 2002).
II. Facts Alleged in the Complaint
The state and federal officials named as defendants in this case have
all moved for dismissal pursuant to various subsections of Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I assume all well-pleaded facts
are as alleged in the complaint, and draw all-reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. See Washington Legal Foundation v.
Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993).
The facts, as [**4] recited in the Complaint, are as follows:
12. On or about the 24th day of November 1996, at approximately 1:30
a.m. The Plaintiff was admitted, through the Emergency room, at
Massachusetts General Hospital (Massachusetts general Hospital) with a
gunshot wound to his lower back buttocks area.
13. Plaintiff was transported to Massachusetts General Hospital by the
Med Trans. Ambulance service.
14. Plaintiff was initially examined at approximately 2:00 a.m. by
attending Trauma Physician RALPH LOUNSBURRY WARREN, M.D. Surgeon.
15. DOCTOR Warren directed, and caused to be carried out, numerous
x-rays, MRI's CT-Scans, and various [*247] other tests to determine
damage to internal organs and ascertain location of projectile.
16. Upon completing a battery of tests, Plaintiff was transferred for
surgery to undergo surgery to extricate projectile and conduct a
Laprascopic Exploration procedure.
17. Surgical preparation began on Plaintiff at approximately 7:00 a.m.
on November 24, 1996.
18. General anesthesia was delivered and [unconsciousness] [sic]
inducted in Plaintiff at approximately 8:10 a.m.
19. During Plaintiff's surgery, an unknown [**5] law enforcement
agent John Doe or agents were in the operating room during Plaintiff's
surgery to supervise the removal of a bullet (projectile) from
Plaintiff.
20. Once projectile was extracted from Plaintiff, it was turned over
to Defendant Doe One, Law Enforcement Agent(s).
21. At approximately 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff was taken from surgery to
Massachusetts General Hospital Recovery/Intensive Care Unit.
22. Between the hours of 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., Plaintiff was
transferred from the Recovery/Intensive Care Unit to a general
residence area where Plaintiff was assigned a two (2) person room.
23. Once Plaintiff regained consciousness and his cognitive skills
returned, he noticed that his right leg had been shaved.
24. Plaintiff was advised by the attending nurse [Name Unknown] [sic]
that the Law Enforcement ordered specimens taken from Plaintiff which
accounted for his shaven leg.
25. On or about the 24th day of November, 1996, between the hours of
approximately 12:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., Plaintiff was interviewed by
Massachusetts General Hospital staff regarding his financial status
and ability to pay incurred hospital bills.
26. Shortly [**6] after being interviewed by Massachusetts General
Hospital staff, as stated in paragraph number twenty (25) [sic] above,
Plaintiff was advised by Massachusetts General Hospital personnel that
the Plaintiff was being discharged from the hospital due to
Plaintiff's inability pay [sic] medical costs.
27. Plaintiff was discharged from Massachusetts General Hospital. On
November 25, 1996, at approximately 2:41 p.m.
28. At approximately 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff was picked up at
Massachusetts General Hospital by family and friends.
29. On or about the 27th day of November 1996, at approximately 9:00
p.m. Plaintiff was again admitted at the Emergency Room of
Massachusetts General Hospital suffering from Abdominal Infection and
fever due to the previously incurred gunshot wound.
30. Upon arrival at Massachusetts General Hospital, Plaintiff was
examined by attending Trauma Physician and a wound swab and blood
cultures were conducted.
31. Plaintiff, was subsequently prescribed medication by Massachusetts
General Hospital doctor(s), which included medication to combat
infection and control pain.
32. Plaintiff left Massachusetts General Hospital after being seen by
the [**7] medical staff and prescribed medication.
[*248] 33. On or about the 28th day of November 1996, at
approximately 12:32 a.m. Plaintiff was admitted for a 3rd time at the
Massachusetts General Hospital Emergency Room, suffering from severe
Abdominal Infection and high fever.
34. Plaintiff was examined by attending trauma physician, JONATHAN N.
ADLER, M.D., who ordered, and caused to be carried out, X-rays of
Plaintiff.
35. Plaintiff was also seen by and spoke with two (2) other medical
staff from time to time. Those being:
PATRICK JACKSON, M.D. and Doctor LUKE MORONE.
36. Plaintiff was transferred to the Radiology Department at
approximately 2:00 a.m. where Plaintiff was seen by Radiologists MARK
J. RIEUMONT, M.D. and SUSIE Y. KIM.
37. Radiologists RIEUMONT and KlM conducted x-rays of Plaintiff, the
results of which were received by Plaintiff, through Collateral
Litigation, and showed the following:
(A). No definite Pneumonia.
(B). On the lateral view, there is a "linear opacity" in the abdomen
which most likely represents and "artifact".
38. Upon Completion of x-rays, the Plaintiff [**8] left Massachusetts
General Hospital at approximately 3:00. a.m. on November 28, 1996.
39. On or about the 15th day of December, 1996, Plaintiff and a
companion (Charles McConnell), were at the Logan International Airport
("L.I.A."), East Boston Massachusetts.
40. At approximately 10:00 a.m. while exiting the Logan International
Airport, the Plaintiff was confronted by several gun wielding
individuals, claiming to be law enforcement agents.
41. Plaintiff was forced to lie down where he was searched, handcuffed
and placed into custody by these agents.
42. Defendants GAMMEL, FARLEY, ROBERTO, KELLY, PETERSON, DESMOND,
CUNIFF, SOILES, QUIGLEY and several JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, took part
in the arrest of Plaintiff stated in paragraphs number forty (40) and
forty-one (41) above.
43. While in the custody of agents, Plaintiff was approached by
Defendant ROBERTO, who attempted to gain Plaintiff's authorization and
signature on a document.
44. The document stated in paragraph forty-three (43) above was
purporting to be an "authorization" for the surgical removal of an
electronic device from Plaintiff's body.
45. Defendant [**9] ROBERTO, informed Plaintiff, that Plaintiff had
been implanted with an "a microchip tracking device" and law
enforcement (Drug Enforcement Agency/Federal Bureau Investigation) had
been tracing Plaintiff since on or about November 25, 1996.
46. Defendant ROBERTO, further stated to Plaintiff that it was on "on
loan" to Drug Enforcement Agency from the Central Intelligence Agency
(C.I.A.) and was a sophisticated state of the art piece of equipment,
cost a lot of money. Must be returned to the CIA.
47. Defendant ROBERTO, assured Plaintiff that he (Plaintiff) would be
released on bail if Plaintiff would [*249] sign documents and
consent to surgical removal of device.
48. Plaintiff refused to sign the consent forms. Defendant DESMOND
stated "Nobody will ever believe we did this".
49. Plaintiff was transported from Logan International Airport to the
Drug Enforcement Agency's New England Field Division Office (Field
Office) in Boston, Massachusetts.
50. While being transported from the Logan International Airport to
the field office, Defendant's FARLEY, and QUIGLEY, continued to entice
Plaintiff to consent to the surgical [**10] removal of the device.
51. Upon arrival at the Field Office, Defendant FARLEY, directed
Plaintiff's attention to an office door within the Field Office
building that displayed the name plate of one "Dr. STEIN."
52. Defendant FARLEY, advised Plaintiff that Dr. STEIN was the
individual responsible for conduction, or causing to have conducted,
the surgical implantation of the device, in Plaintiff.
53. While at the Field Office, Plaintiff was subjected to
identification process (i.e. Finger printing, Photographs, etc...).
While there Defendant SOILES stated "The implant in you, the devices
capabilities are tracking and listening. We used the Massachusetts
General Hospital Medical Doctors and Nurses and our own physician to
do a clean implant while you were under General Anesthesia". Defendant
JOHN GAMMEL agreed and said we knew where you were from Boston to
Nevada to Arizona. State of the Art Device.
54. Upon the completion of identification process Plaintiff was
transported to the Braintree Police Station (Braintree) for housing.
Defendants: DEA Agents; KELLY & PETERSON Transported Plaintiff and
[**11] also tried to convince plaintiff to consent to removal of
Device.
55. While being taken from the Field Office to a vehicle for
transportation to Braintree, one of the Principal Defendant's
(possibly Defendant CUNIFF), informed Plaintiff that, "He (Plaintiff),
was the only person with the device on the East Coast" and went on to
mention another person implanted with the device on the "West Coast".
56. During the discussion stated in paragraph number fifty-five (55),
above this Defendant further mentioned the source of "device" as the
Central Intelligence Agency.
57. Plaintiff was subsequently transported to, and housed at the
Braintree Station.
58. On or about the 16th day of December 1996, Plaintiff was taken to
the Boston Massachusetts Federal Building and arraigned on Federal
criminal Charges before U.S. Magistrate Judge LAWRENCE COHEN.
59. Plaintiff was transported from the Boston Federal Building, to the
Wyatt detention facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island where he
remained housed.
60. On the 6th day of January 1997, Plaintiff was brought before the
Honorable Magistrate Judge JUDGE ROBERT B. COLLINGS, U.S. District
[**12] Court Judge, for the purpose of a Bond Hearing.
[*250] 61. During the Bond Hearing stated in paragraph number sixty
(60) above; Defendant FARLEY, testified that he heard the conversation
at Logan International Airport between Defendant Roberto, and the
Plaintiff in which Defendant ROBERTO, informed Plaintiff about the
Plaintiff being implanted with a "device" which monitored Plaintiff
activities.
62. Defendant FARLEY, further testified that it was his belief that
ROBERTO, was merely joking with the Plaintiff regarding the "device".
63. Upon adjournment of the January 6th Bond Hearing Plaintiff was
returned to the Central Falls Facility for housing.
64. On June 14, 1999, a hearing was conducted (without the presence of
Plaintiff) at the Federal Court Building Worcester, Massachusetts
before the Honorable NATHANIEL M. GORTON, U.S. District Court Judge,
at which time Judge GORTON, ordered Assistant U.S. Attorney's JEFFREY
AUERHAHN, and CYNTHIA YOUNG, to ascertain whether or not agent's
discussed a device being implanted in Plaintiff, and whether such
implantation did occur.
65. As a result of Judge [**13] GORTON'S, June 14th Court Order the
record reflects that certain Defendant's did in fact advise Plaintiff
that a device was implanted in him, however, these Defendants were
allegedly joking and there was no implantation of such device in
Plaintiff.
66. On the 25th day of May, 2000, the Honorable JOSEPH TAURO, United
States District Judge, ordered the government to cause to be affected
and M.R.I. on Plaintiff to conclusively ascertain the existence of any
electronic device implanted in the Plaintiff.
67. Judge TAURO's, May 25th Judicial order stated in paragraphs number
66 above, has to this date not been effectuated.
68. Plaintiff was under Federal/State investigation and surveillance,
and monitoring at the time of and prior to Plaintiff's admission at
Massachusetts General Hospital for gunshot wound.
69. As a product of discovery process conducted in a malpractice
lawsuit against Massachusetts general Hospital, et al. (Case No:
99-5655H), Plaintiff has procured conclusive medical evidence that
there did exist a foreign "artifact" inside Plaintiff at time of
x-rays conducted at Massachusetts General Hospital, as set forth in
paragraph [**14] numbers 36 and 37 above. This device remains inside
Plaintiff.
Docket No. 1 at 5-14.
The docket entries in United States v. Vincent Portalla, a.k.a.
Vincent Marino, Criminal No. 97-10026 for the dates referred to in
paragraphs 58, 60-62, and 66 of the complaint are reproduced in
Attachment A. The docket entries in United States v. Vincent Michael
Marino, a.k.a. Gigi Portalla, Criminal No. 97-40009 for the
proceedings of June 14, 1999, referred to in paragraphs 64 and 65 of
the complaint are also reproduced in Attachment A
III. Interpretation of Pro-Se Pleadings
This court has a duty to construe pro se submissions with liberality,
and does so in this case as in others. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,
9, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163, 101 S. Ct. 173 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 92 [*251] S. Ct. 594
(1972) (per curiam); see also Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 54
n. 5 (1st Cir.1993). For this reason, even though the complaint is
unclear in relation to the precise nature of the claims being
asserted, I treat the complaint as sufficient to give notice to the
defendants and the court [**15] that the plaintiff is making Bivens
claims against federal defendants, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619,
91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), and claims against state defendants remediable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IV. Verification of Pleadings
The court's obligation to accept alleged facts as true for the
purposes of rulings on a motion to dismiss is limited to well-pleaded
facts. Washington Legal Foundation, 993 F.2d at 971. Whether facts are
well-pleaded may depend on (1) the nature of those facts, (2) whether
reasonably expectable sources of verification are identified and, when
examined, do or do not verify the allegations, and (3) whether facts
that are well-pleaded identify reasons to expect that records and
witnesses who might verify allegations are accessible to a defendant
but not to the plaintiff. See, e.g., New England Data Servs., Inc. v.
Becher, 829 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1987).
The facts alleged in the complaint in this case include allegations
that multiple hearings were held before two magistrate judges and two
district judges of [**16] this court during which rulings were made.
The record now before the undersigned judge, however, does not include
docket entries, reporter transcripts, or memoranda and orders that
would either verify or show falsity of these allegations. Thus, on the
record now before me, I cannot determine whether many of these alleged
facts are well-pleaded facts.
For example, plaintiff asserts in paragraph 66 that Judge Tauro
ordered the government to cause to be affected and M.R.I. on Plaintiff
to conclusively ascertain the existence of any electronic device
implanted in the Plaintiff
on May 25, 2000. The record from plaintiff's criminal case, over which
Judge Tauro presided, does reflect that the plaintiff appeared before
Judge Tauro on that date, entered a guilty plea, and was sentenced.
Docket Nos. 102, 103, 104, and 106 in Criminal No. 97-10026. Nothing
in the record now before me suggests or refers to, even obliquely, any
statements by anyone at the hearing regarding an M.R.I. Therefore, I
cannot at this time determine that the allegations in paragraph 66 are
not well-pleaded. Also, I cannot determine whether the rule of
pleading explained in Becher does or does not apply. [**17]
V. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
The federal defendants in this case have filed two separate Motions to
Dismiss (Docket Nos. 21 and 72). The later motion was filed on behalf
of three defendants who were served after the first motion was filed.
Because the memoranda supporting the motions make identical
substantive arguments, I treat them together.
A chief contention of the federal defendants is that plaintiff filed
this suit after his claims were barred under the applicable statute of
limitation. The federal defendants also assert that the action against
them is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, that the
complaint fails to state a claim against them because it is cast as a
Section 1983 claim, and that the complaint should be dismissed as
frivolous.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts urges that the case against Lt.
Thomas Quigley in his official capacity be dismissed because it is a
claim for damages against [*252] the state that is barred by the
Commonwealth's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and that, in any
event, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
VI. More on the Claim Against the Federal Defendants
A. Failure to State [**18] a Claim
To the extent that the federal defendants seek dismissal because the
complaint is cast as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, their request
must be denied. As is noted above, pro se plaintiffs are not held to
the same strict standards of pleading that parties who are represented
by counsel are expected to meet. The court therefore treats the claims
against the federal defendants as Bivens claims and will not dismiss
this action merely because the complaint does not explicitly say that
plaintiff is asserting Bivens claims.
B. Frivolousness
The federal defendants characterize plaintiff's allegations as
"fantastic and delusional," and urge that the court dismiss the civil
action for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The cases cited by the federal defendants,
however, do not support the contention that a court has authority to
make such an order without a showing of grounds for concluding that no
reasonable adjudicator could credit enough of the allegations to
determine that a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
Bell v. Hood and its progeny arguably support a dismissal of federal
claims [**19] when those claims are patently frivolous as a matter of
law. 327 U.S. 678, 683, 66 S. Ct. 773, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946). In Bell,
however, the Court did not determine whether the alleged facts were
credible. Rather, noting that "if the allegations have any foundation
in truth, the plaintiffs' legal rights have been ruthlessly violated,"
the Court reversed the district court's dismissal. Id.
The case on which the federal defendants rely most stridently, Neitzke
v. Williams, is wholly inapplicable on this issue. 490 U.S. 319, 109
S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). In that case, the Court
interpreted the term "frivolous" as it appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
That section, which has since been amended in ways that are not
relevant here, allows a district court to dismiss a civil action in
which the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis whenever the court
determines that the action is frivolous. The civil docket sheet for
this civil action and the stamp placed on the Complaint by the office
of the Clerk of this court both indicate that the plaintiff paid the $
150.00 filing fee. Therefore, Section 1915 and Neitzke are
inapplicable here.
C. Sovereign Immunity of Federal Defendants [**20] Sued in their
Official Capacities
Actions brought against federal employees in their official capacities
are actions against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2679; Hawaii v.
Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 10 L. Ed. 2d 191, 83 S. Ct. 1052 (1963). Actions
against the United States are allowed only in the limited situations
where the United States has, by a specific statutory provision, waived
its immunity. Bivens actions, therefore, which do not arise under any
statute, may not be brought against the United States or its officials
acting in their official capacity. Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28
(1st Cir. 2000).
In limited circumstances, the United States has waived its immunity
with respect to the intentional torts of federal law enforcement
officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. That waiver, however, requires that a
claimant file a claim with the relevant federal agency within two
years after the claim has occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 2401; [*253] Roman
v. Townsend, 224 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2000). Only after such a claim
is denied may a claimant resort to a suit [**21] against the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 2675.
Plaintiff has not asserted that he filed a claim with the Drug
Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Central
Intelligence Agency, or any other federal entity. This failure
precludes this court from accepting this civil action as a suit for
damages against the United States and its officers in official
capacities.
Of course, the immunity of the United States does not preclude this
court from issuing an appropriate writ if one is required by the facts
of the case and applicable law, and does not preclude the maintenance
of a Bivens action against the federal officials in their individual
capacities. See Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000).
D. Timeliness
Ordinarily a federal court looks to the most closely analogous state
statute of limitation governing personal injury claims for guidance as
to the period of limitation to be applied to Bivens claims and Section
1983 claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254,
105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985) (Section 1983 claims); Roman v. Townsend, 224
F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) [**22] (Bivens actions). Massachusetts
has a three-year limitation period for personal injuries claims. Mass.
Gen. Laws c. 260, § 2A.
Even when the period of limitation is determined by analogy to state
law, the determination regarding the time of accrual of a cause of
action is governed by federal law. Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46,
52 (1st Cir. 2000). In this circuit, Bivens and Section 1983 claims
accrue at the moment the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of
the injury that is the basis for the claims. Id. See also Brackett v.
United States, 270 F.3d 60, 68 n.4 (1st Cir. 2001) ("in tort law under
the discovery rule, the running of the statute of limitations does not
begin until the fact of the injury becomes known, or should have
become known in the exercise of due diligence"). Federal courts may
adopt any state tolling rules that are not at odds with federal law.
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-486, 64 L. Ed. 2d 440,
100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980).
The federal defendants assert that plaintiff's claim accrued on
December 15, 1996, (more than two years before plaintiff initiated
this civil action) when Defendant [**23] Roberto informed plaintiff
that "a microchip tracking device" was implanted in plaintiff, and
requested plaintiff's authorization for its removal. The court,
however, cannot at the same time credit federal defendants' assertion
that plaintiff's claim about the planting of a "microchip tracking
device" is frivolous and credit federal defendants' assertion that at
the time of that incident plaintiff knew or should have known "the
fact of injury" to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff asserts that he is the victim of an on-going conspiracy and
that the statute of limitation, therefore, has not yet run. Docket No.
50 at 33-35. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that the statute
should be tolled because he is incarcerated in a federal penitentiary,
has limited access to legal materials, and, at least during the
pendency of his criminal case, was incarcerated in a facility that
provided no access whatsoever to legal materials. Id. at 35-36.
Finally, plaintiff argues that his cause of action did not accrue
until November 24, 1999, when he reviewed an x-ray film report. Id. at
73.
Another issue arises from the fact that the federal defendants, under
oath at the plaintiff's criminal trial, [**24] Docket No. 1 P62 &
65, repudiated the comments allegedly made on December 15, 1996. In
these [*254] circumstances, I cannot at this time determine whether
plaintiff is or is not entitled to the benefit of a doctrine of
equitable tolling that would stand in the way of dismissal of this
civil action. See Andrews v. Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co., 423 Mass.
1021, 1021, 673 N.E.2d 40, 41 (Mass. 1996).
VII. More on the Claims Against the State Defendant
The state defendant, Lt. Thomas Quigley, is sued in both his
individual and official capacities. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
moved to dismiss the claims brought against Lt. Quigley in his
official capacity only (Docket No. 18, filed June 12, 2001; Docket No.
77, filed November 7, 2001).
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is the real party in interest when a
state police officer is sued for damages in his official capacity.
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 112 S. Ct. 358
(1991). It is well-established that a state is not amenable to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a state is not a "person" within the
meaning of that statute. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). [**25] For
these reasons, the Order below DISMISSES the claims that seek monetary
damages against the Commonwealth and against Lt. Quigley in his
official capacity.
Although injunctive relief may be available against state officials
sued in their official capacities, see, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908), plaintiff's complaint fails
to state a viable claim for injunctive relief. The facts recited
above, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff do not
establish that Lt. Quigley is engaged in a continuing violation of
federal law. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S.
Ct. 1347 (1974). Injunctive relief, which is prospective in nature, is
not available to remedy past violations. Id. For these reasons, the
Order below DISMISSES claims for injunctive relief against Lt. Quigley
in his official capacity.
VIII. Plaintiff's Motions
A. Plaintiff's Motions for Disclosure and Production of Newly
Discovered Documents Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26 and Rule 34 (Docket No.
53, filed December 3, 2001; Docket No. 56, filed December 6, 2001; and
Docket No. 76, filed February 19, 2002)
In Docket [**26] Numbers 53 and 56, which are identical in all
respects, plaintiff seeks to place two documents into evidence. In
Docket Number 76, plaintiff seeks to place various testimony and other
exhibits into evidence. At the present time, no motion for summary
judgment is before this court. Also, plaintiff has not identified any
other pending matter as to which the testimony presented in Docket No.
76 would be appropriately received in evidence.
For these reasons, the Order below DENIES Docket Nos. 53, 56, and 76.
This ruling is without prejudice to the later filing of an appropriate
request in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment or to the introduction of this evidence for a legitimate
reason at trial or any other hearing.
B. Plaintiff's Motion of Disclosure and Production of Newly Discovered
Documents re: United States Patent Number: 5,629,678 of Human Implants
of Tracking Devices and Other State of the Art Capabilities. All Being
Disclosed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26 and Rule 34 (Docket No.
61, filed January 7, 2002)
As the caption above indicates, in Docket Number 61, plaintiff seeks
to place certain information related to various patents and inventions
[**27] into evidence. This information is not relevant to any issue
[*255] now before this court. For this reason, the Order below DENIES
Docket No. 61.
C. Motions to Clarify Medical Term "Artifact" (Docket Nos. 57, filed
December 20, 2001 and 62, filed January 10, 2002)
In Docket Numbers 57 and 62, which are identical in all respects,
plaintiff seeks to have the court clarify the term "artifact."
Plaintiff asserts that this term appears on at least one of his
medical records.
The definition of the term "artifact" in general is not decisive of
any issue now before the court. The meaning of that term as it appears
on plaintiff's medical record or records, however, may become
important in relation to a motion for summary judgment, at a trial on
the merits, or at an evidentiary hearing at which this evidence could
be received for a legitimate purpose.
For these reasons, the Order below DENIES Docket Nos. 57 and 62.
D. Motion to Offer Caselaw to Prohibit Defense Attorneys from
Protection of Defendants who Continue to Conspire Together in
Furtherance of Conspiracy and Conspiracy of Silence to Cover Up
Discovery (Docket No. 59, filed January 7, 2002)
The Order below DENIES Docket [**28] No. 59 as a Motion. The court
treats this pro-se submission as a memorandum of law, however and has
considered plaintiff's arguments of law presented in this document.
E. Motion of Notice via sharing an Attorney [AUSA Anita Johnson] with
Original Defendants and also via Identity of Interest with Originally
Named Defendants (Docket No. 60, filed January 7, 2002)
The Order below DISMISSES Docket No. 60 as moot in light of the
Statement of Defendant Regarding Service on Individuals (Docket No.
67, filed January 10, 2002) and the Declaration of Assistant U.S.
Attorney Regarding Service (Docket No. 68, filed January 10, 2002).
The Declaration indicates that the two named defendants have now been
served.
IX. Remaining Issues
In the order below, the defendants are directed to file their answer
or answers or other responsive pleadings no later than Monday, April
1, 2002.
Any party or attorney with knowledge of the x-ray and radiology report
referred to in P37 of the complaint and who asserts or may assert a
privilege with respect to those documents may file an application to
file the documents under seal.
In the Order below, any party receiving notice of this Order and
[**29] having custody of any documents, medical records, x-rays, or
other evidence related to the claims asserted in this civil action is
directed to preserve those items pending a further order of this
court.
All parties are directed to file a proposed schedule for the efficient
adjudication of this matter no later than April 15, 2002.
ORDER
For the reasons explained above, it is ORDERED:
(1) Federal Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docket No. 21, filed July
10, 2001 and Docket No. 72, filed February 7, 2002) are ALLOWED to the
extent that the complaint seeks damages from federal officials acting
in their official capacity, and are otherwise DENIED;
(2) Thomas Quigley's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 77, filed November
7, 2001) is ALLOWED to the extent that it seeks a dismissal of the
case against Lt. Quigley in his official capacity, and is otherwise
DENIED;
[*256] (3) Plaintiff's Motions for Disclosure and Production of
Newly Discovered Documents Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 26 and Rule 34
(Docket No. 53, filed December 3, 2001 and Docket No. 56, filed
December 6, 2001) are DENIED;
(4) Plaintiff's Motion of Newly Discovered Evidence Offered Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26 and Rule [**30] 34 (Docket No. 76, filed
February 19, 2002) is DENIED;
(5) Plaintiff's Disclosure and Production of Newly Discovered
Documents (Docket No. 61, filed January 7, 2002) is DENIED;
(6) Plaintiff's Motions to Clarify Medical Term Artifact (Docket No.
57, filed December 20, 2001 and Docket No. 62, filed January 10, 2002)
are DENIED;
(7) Plaintiff's Motion to Offer Caselaw to Prohibit Defense Attorneys
from Protection of Defendants who Continue to Conspire Together in
Furtherance of Conspiracy and Conspiracy of Silence to Cover Up
Discovery (Docket No. 59, filed January 7, 2002) is DENIED;
(8) Plaintiff's Notice via Sharing an Attorney with Original
Defendants and Also via Identify of Interest with Originally Named
Defendants (Docket No. 60, filed January 7, 2002) is DISMISSED as
moot;
(9) Any party receiving notice of this Order and having custody of any
documents, medical records, x-rays, or other evidence related to the
claims asserted in this civil action is directed to preserve those
items pending a further order of this court
(10) All defendants are directed to file their answer or answers or
other responsive pleadings no later than Monday, April 1, 2002. All
parties are directed [**31] to file a proposed schedule for the
efficient adjudication of this matter no later than April 15, 2002.
Robert E. Keeton
United States District Judge
Attachment A
Reproduction of Docket Entries in United States v. Vincent Portalla,
a.k.a. Gigi, a.k.a. Vincent Marino, Criminal No. 97-10026, for the
dates identified in the Complaint in Civil Action No. 01-10116-REKDate
Docket # Docket Entry
12/16/96 3 MOTION by USA as to Vincent Portalla, Charles McConnell to
unseal the Complaint, supporting Affidavit, filed.
[1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 -- Mag. Judge Lawrence P. Cohen. ENDORSED ORDER as to Vincent
Portalla, Charles McConnell: granting [3-1] motion to
unseal the Complaint, supporting Affidavit as to Vincent
Portalla (1). [1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 -- Initial appearance as to Vincent Portalla, Charles
McConnell held (Defendant informed of rights.).
[1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 -- MOTION made in open court by USA as to Vincent Portalla,
Charles McConnell, for detention, to continue.
[1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 -- Mag. Judge Lawrence P. Cohen. ORAL ORDER as to Vincent
Portalla, Charles McConnell granting [0-0] oral motion to
continue as to Vincent Portalla (1), Charles McConnell (2).
[1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 4 Mag. Judge Lawrence P. Cohen. CLERK'S NOTES as to Vincent
Portalla re: Initial Appearance; set Detention Hearing for
2:00 p.m. on 12/18/96 for Vincent Portalla Court Reporter:
TAPE [1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
. . .
01/06/97 -- Preliminary Examination as to Vincent Portalla held.
[1:96-m-171] (jam) [Entry date 01/09/97]
01/06/97 15 Mag. Judge Robert B. Collings for Mag. Judge
Cohen. CLERK'S NOTES as to Vincent Portalla, re:
Preliminary Exam. and Evidentiary Hearing held. Probable
cause found. Detention taken under advisement.; Court
Reporter: Tape [1:96-m-171] (jam) [Entry
date 01/09/97]
01/06/97 16 NOTICE of Appearance of counsel for Vincent Portalla, by
Attorney Robert L. Sheketoff. [1:96-m-171] (jam)
[Entry date 01/09/97]
01/06/97 17 Exhibit list by USA as to Vincent Portalla, filed.
[1:96-m-171] (jam) [Entry date 01/09/97]
05/25/00 -- Change of Plea Hearing as to Vincent Portalla held. (cmg)
[Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 -- PLEA entered by Vincent Portalla. Court accepts plea.
Guilty: Vincent Portalla (1) count(s) 4s (cmg)
[Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 102 Judge Joseph L. Tauro. CLERK'S NOTES as to Vincent
Portalla, re: change of plea. Deft present w/counsel for
change of plea. Court conducts plea colloquy. Deft enters
plea of guilty to Count 4. Counts 1,2,3 and 5 to be
dismissed by Govt upon sentencing. Govt's factual basis for
plea. Court accepts plea. Disposition immediately to be
concurrent w/D.J. Gorton sentence. P.S.R. is not completed.
Court Reporter: Teri Gibson (cmg) [Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 -- Sentencing held Vincent Portalla (1) count(s) 4s. (cmg)
[Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 103 Judge Joseph L. Tauro. CLERK'S NOTES as to Vincent
Portalla, re: sentencing. AT request of deft and Govt's
attorney, Court proceeds to sentencing phase. Joint
recommendation of parties is adopted by the Court and
imposed as follows: 10 years custody Atty. Gen. on Count 4
to be served currently w/CR 97-40009, 10.3 years Supervised
Release. No Fine. $ 100 special assessment. Court
recommends that deft serve his sentence as close to
Massachusetts as possible. Court Reporter: Teri Gibson
(cmg) [Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 104 Plea Agreement as to Vincent Portalla, Marked as Exhibit
I,
FILED.(c/s) (cmg) [Entry date 06/01/00]
[**32]
[*257] Reproduction of Docket Entries in United States v. Vincent
Michael Marino, Criminal No. 97-40009, for the dates identified in the
Complaint in Civil Action No. 01-10116-REKDate Docket # Docket Entry
06/14/99 -- Status conference as to Robert F. Carrozza, Michael P.
Romano Sr., Anthony Ciampi, John J. Patti III, Eugene A.
Rida Jr., Vincent Michael Marino and Nazzaro Ralph Scarpa
held. (jb) [Entry date 06/23/99]
06/14/99 903 Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton. CLERK'S NOTES as to Robert F.
Carrozza, Michael P. Romano Sr., Anthony Ciampi, John J.
Patti III, Eugene A. Rida Jr., Vincent Michael Marino,
Nazzaro Ralph Scarpa, re: status conference; case called;
counsel and defendant Carrozza pro-se appear for status
conference. Hearing held on motions. Motion # 843, 861, 869
and 876 DENIED. Motions # 844, 858, 870 879 and 881
ALLOWED. Final status conference set for 9/8/99 at 3:30 pm.
set final status conference for 3:30 pm on 9/8/99 for
Robert F. Carrozza, for Michael P. Romano Sr., for Anthony
Ciampi, for John J. III, for Eugene A. Rida Jr., for
Vincent Michael Marino, Nazzaro Ralph Scarpa; Court
Reporter: C. Dahlstrom. (jb) [Entry date 06/23/99]
[**33]
CUNIFF, SOILES, QUIGLEY and several JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, took part
in the arrest of Plaintiff stated in paragraphs number forty (40) and
forty-one (41) above.
43. While in the custody of agents, Plaintiff was approached by
Defendant ROBERTO, who attempted to gain Plaintiff's authorization and
signature on a document.
44. The document stated in paragraph forty-three (43) above was
purporting to be an "authorization" for the surgical removal of an
electronic device from Plaintiff's body.
45. Defendant [**9] ROBERTO, informed Plaintiff, that Plaintiff had
been implanted with an "a microchip tracking device" and law
enforcement (Drug Enforcement Agency/Federal Bureau Investigation) had
been tracing Plaintiff since on or about November 25, 1996.
46. Defendant ROBERTO, further stated to Plaintiff that it was on "on
loan" to Drug Enforcement Agency from the Central Intelligence Agency
(C.I.A.) and was a sophisticated state of the art piece of equipment,
cost a lot of money. Must be returned to the CIA.
47. Defendant ROBERTO, assured Plaintiff that he (Plaintiff) would be
released on bail if Plaintiff would [*249] sign documents and
consent to surgical removal of device.
48. Plaintiff refused to sign the consent forms. Defendant DESMOND
stated "Nobody will ever believe we did this".
49. Plaintiff was transported from Logan International Airport to the
Drug Enforcement Agency's New England Field Division Office (Field
Office) in Boston, Massachusetts.
50. While being transported from the Logan International Airport to
the field office, Defendant's FARLEY, and QUIGLEY, continued to entice
Plaintiff to consent to the surgical [**10] removal of the device.
++++++++++++++++++++++++
VINCENT MICHAEL MARINO, a/k/a Vincent Michael Portalla, Plaintiff v.
JOHN GAMMEL, FBI Agent, DAMIEN FARLEY, DEA Agent, ANTHONY ROBERTO, DEA
Agent, VINCENT KELLY, DEA Agent, NORMAN PETERSON, DEA Agent, JOSEPH
DESMOND, DEA Agent, MICHAEL CUNIFF, DEA Agent, JAMES SOILES, DEA,
Agent, THOMAS QUIGLEY, Massachusetts State Police, and JOHN AND JANE
DOES 1-20, Defendants
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-10116-REK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
191 F. Supp. 2d 243; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4471
March 5, 2002, Decided
DISPOSITION: Defendants' motions to dismiss were granted, in part.
Plaintiff's discovery motions were denied. Plaintiff's other motions
were denied or dismissed.
COUNSEL: [**1] VINCENT MICHAEL MARINO aka Vincent Michael Portalla,
Plaintiff, Pro se, Atlanta, GA.
For JOHN GAMMEL, FBI Agent, DAMIEN FARLEY, DEA Agent, ANTHONY ROBERTO,
DEA Agent, VINCENT KELLY, DEA Agent, JOSEPH DESMOND, DEA Agent,
MICHAEL CUNIFF, DEA Agent, JAMES SOILES, DEA Agent, THOMAS QUIGLEY,
Massachusetts State Police, JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-20, Defendants: Anita
Johnson, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA.
For THOMAS QUIGLEY, Massachusetts State Police, Defendant: Marini
Torres-Benson, Office of the Attorney General, Boston, MA.
JUDGES: Robert E. Keeton, United States District Judge.
OPINIONBY: Robert E. Keeton
OPINION: [*245] Memorandum and Order
March 5, 2002
I. Pending Matters
Pending for decision are the matters associated with the following
filings:
(1) Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 21, filed July
10, 2001), with accompanying memorandum in support (Docket No. 22,
filed July 10, 2001);
(2) Thomas Quigley's Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Docket No. 77, filed November 7, 2001), with accompanying
memorandum in support (Docket No. 18, filed June 12, 2001);
[*246] (3) Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
(Docket No. 50, filed November 2, 2001); [**2]
(4) Plaintiff's Motion for Disclosure and Production of Newly
Discovered Documents Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 26 and Rule 34 (Docket
No. 53, filed December 3, 2001);
(5) Plaintiff's Motion for Disclosure and Production of Newly
Discovered Documents Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 26 and Rule 34 (Docket
No. 56, filed December 6, 2001);
(6) Plaintiff's Motion to Clarify Medical Term Artifact (Docket No.
57, filed December 20, 2001);
(7) Plaintiff's Motion to Offer Caselaw to Prohibit Defense Attorneys
from Protection of Defendants who Continue to Conspire Together in
Furtherance of Conspiracy and Conspiracy of Silence to Cover Up
Discovery (Docket No. 59, filed January 7, 2002);
(8) Plaintiff's Notice via Sharing an Attorney with Original
Defendants and Also via Identify of Interest with Originally Named
Defendants (Docket No. 60, filed January 7, 2002);
(9) Plaintiff's Motion of Disclosure and Production of Newly
Discovered Documents re: United States Patent Number: 5,629,678 of
Human Implants of Tracking Devices and Other State of the Art
Capabilities, All Being Disclosed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26
and Rule 34 (Docket No. 61, filed January 7, 2002);
(10) Plaintiff's Response [**3] in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
(Docket No. 64, filed January 10, 2002);
(11) Plaintiff's Motion to Clarify Medical Term Artifact (Docket No.
62, filed January 10, 2002);
(12) Defendants' Reply to Marino's Opposition to Dismissal (Docket No.
71, filed January 24, 2002); and
(13) Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 72, filed
February 7, 2002), with accompanying memorandum in support (Docket No.
73, filed February 7, 2002);
(14) Plaintiff's Additional Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
Dismiss (Docket No. 75, filed February 19, 2002); and
(15) Plaintiff's Motion of Newly Discovered Evidence Offered Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26 and Rule 34 (Docket No. 76, filed February
19, 2002).
II. Facts Alleged in the Complaint
The state and federal officials named as defendants in this case have
all moved for dismissal pursuant to various subsections of Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I assume all well-pleaded facts
are as alleged in the complaint, and draw all-reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. See Washington Legal Foundation v.
Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993).
The facts, as [**4] recited in the Complaint, are as follows:
12. On or about the 24th day of November 1996, at approximately 1:30
a.m. The Plaintiff was admitted, through the Emergency room, at
Massachusetts General Hospital (Massachusetts general Hospital) with a
gunshot wound to his lower back buttocks area.
13. Plaintiff was transported to Massachusetts General Hospital by the
Med Trans. Ambulance service.
14. Plaintiff was initially examined at approximately 2:00 a.m. by
attending Trauma Physician RALPH LOUNSBURRY WARREN, M.D. Surgeon.
15. DOCTOR Warren directed, and caused to be carried out, numerous
x-rays, MRI's CT-Scans, and various [*247] other tests to determine
damage to internal organs and ascertain location of projectile.
16. Upon completing a battery of tests, Plaintiff was transferred for
surgery to undergo surgery to extricate projectile and conduct a
Laprascopic Exploration procedure.
17. Surgical preparation began on Plaintiff at approximately 7:00 a.m.
on November 24, 1996.
18. General anesthesia was delivered and [unconsciousness] [sic]
inducted in Plaintiff at approximately 8:10 a.m.
19. During Plaintiff's surgery, an unknown [**5] law enforcement
agent John Doe or agents were in the operating room during Plaintiff's
surgery to supervise the removal of a bullet (projectile) from
Plaintiff.
20. Once projectile was extracted from Plaintiff, it was turned over
to Defendant Doe One, Law Enforcement Agent(s).
21. At approximately 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff was taken from surgery to
Massachusetts General Hospital Recovery/Intensive Care Unit.
22. Between the hours of 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., Plaintiff was
transferred from the Recovery/Intensive Care Unit to a general
residence area where Plaintiff was assigned a two (2) person room.
23. Once Plaintiff regained consciousness and his cognitive skills
returned, he noticed that his right leg had been shaved.
24. Plaintiff was advised by the attending nurse [Name Unknown] [sic]
that the Law Enforcement ordered specimens taken from Plaintiff which
accounted for his shaven leg.
25. On or about the 24th day of November, 1996, between the hours of
approximately 12:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., Plaintiff was interviewed by
Massachusetts General Hospital staff regarding his financial status
and ability to pay incurred hospital bills.
26. Shortly [**6] after being interviewed by Massachusetts General
Hospital staff, as stated in paragraph number twenty (25) [sic] above,
Plaintiff was advised by Massachusetts General Hospital personnel that
the Plaintiff was being discharged from the hospital due to
Plaintiff's inability pay [sic] medical costs.
27. Plaintiff was discharged from Massachusetts General Hospital. On
November 25, 1996, at approximately 2:41 p.m.
28. At approximately 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff was picked up at
Massachusetts General Hospital by family and friends.
29. On or about the 27th day of November 1996, at approximately 9:00
p.m. Plaintiff was again admitted at the Emergency Room of
Massachusetts General Hospital suffering from Abdominal Infection and
fever due to the previously incurred gunshot wound.
30. Upon arrival at Massachusetts General Hospital, Plaintiff was
examined by attending Trauma Physician and a wound swab and blood
cultures were conducted.
31. Plaintiff, was subsequently prescribed medication by Massachusetts
General Hospital doctor(s), which included medication to combat
infection and control pain.
32. Plaintiff left Massachusetts General Hospital after being seen by
the [**7] medical staff and prescribed medication.
[*248] 33. On or about the 28th day of November 1996, at
approximately 12:32 a.m. Plaintiff was admitted for a 3rd time at the
Massachusetts General Hospital Emergency Room, suffering from severe
Abdominal Infection and high fever.
34. Plaintiff was examined by attending trauma physician, JONATHAN N.
ADLER, M.D., who ordered, and caused to be carried out, X-rays of
Plaintiff.
35. Plaintiff was also seen by and spoke with two (2) other medical
staff from time to time. Those being:
PATRICK JACKSON, M.D. and Doctor LUKE MORONE.
36. Plaintiff was transferred to the Radiology Department at
approximately 2:00 a.m. where Plaintiff was seen by Radiologists MARK
J. RIEUMONT, M.D. and SUSIE Y. KIM.
37. Radiologists RIEUMONT and KlM conducted x-rays of Plaintiff, the
results of which were received by Plaintiff, through Collateral
Litigation, and showed the following:
(A). No definite Pneumonia.
(B). On the lateral view, there is a "linear opacity" in the abdomen
which most likely represents and "artifact".
38. Upon Completion of x-rays, the Plaintiff [**8] left Massachusetts
General Hospital at approximately 3:00. a.m. on November 28, 1996.
39. On or about the 15th day of December, 1996, Plaintiff and a
companion (Charles McConnell), were at the Logan International Airport
("L.I.A."), East Boston Massachusetts.
40. At approximately 10:00 a.m. while exiting the Logan International
Airport, the Plaintiff was confronted by several gun wielding
individuals, claiming to be law enforcement agents.
41. Plaintiff was forced to lie down where he was searched, handcuffed
and placed into custody by these agents.
42. Defendants GAMMEL, FARLEY, ROBERTO, KELLY, PETERSON, DESMOND,
CUNIFF, SOILES, QUIGLEY and several JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, took part
in the arrest of Plaintiff stated in paragraphs number forty (40) and
forty-one (41) above.
43. While in the custody of agents, Plaintiff was approached by
Defendant ROBERTO, who attempted to gain Plaintiff's authorization and
signature on a document.
44. The document stated in paragraph forty-three (43) above was
purporting to be an "authorization" for the surgical removal of an
electronic device from Plaintiff's body.
45. Defendant [**9] ROBERTO, informed Plaintiff, that Plaintiff had
been implanted with an "a microchip tracking device" and law
enforcement (Drug Enforcement Agency/Federal Bureau Investigation) had
been tracing Plaintiff since on or about November 25, 1996.
46. Defendant ROBERTO, further stated to Plaintiff that it was on "on
loan" to Drug Enforcement Agency from the Central Intelligence Agency
(C.I.A.) and was a sophisticated state of the art piece of equipment,
cost a lot of money. Must be returned to the CIA.
47. Defendant ROBERTO, assured Plaintiff that he (Plaintiff) would be
released on bail if Plaintiff would [*249] sign documents and
consent to surgical removal of device.
48. Plaintiff refused to sign the consent forms. Defendant DESMOND
stated "Nobody will ever believe we did this".
49. Plaintiff was transported from Logan International Airport to the
Drug Enforcement Agency's New England Field Division Office (Field
Office) in Boston, Massachusetts.
50. While being transported from the Logan International Airport to
the field office, Defendant's FARLEY, and QUIGLEY, continued to entice
Plaintiff to consent to the surgical [**10] removal of the device.
51. Upon arrival at the Field Office, Defendant FARLEY, directed
Plaintiff's attention to an office door within the Field Office
building that displayed the name plate of one "Dr. STEIN."
52. Defendant FARLEY, advised Plaintiff that Dr. STEIN was the
individual responsible for conduction, or causing to have conducted,
the surgical implantation of the device, in Plaintiff.
53. While at the Field Office, Plaintiff was subjected to
identification process (i.e. Finger printing, Photographs, etc...).
While there Defendant SOILES stated "The implant in you, the devices
capabilities are tracking and listening. We used the Massachusetts
General Hospital Medical Doctors and Nurses and our own physician to
do a clean implant while you were under General Anesthesia". Defendant
JOHN GAMMEL agreed and said we knew where you were from Boston to
Nevada to Arizona. State of the Art Device.
54. Upon the completion of identification process Plaintiff was
transported to the Braintree Police Station (Braintree) for housing.
Defendants: DEA Agents; KELLY & PETERSON Transported Plaintiff and
[**11] also tried to convince plaintiff to consent to removal of
Device.
55. While being taken from the Field Office to a vehicle for
transportation to Braintree, one of the Principal Defendant's
(possibly Defendant CUNIFF), informed Plaintiff that, "He (Plaintiff),
was the only person with the device on the East Coast" and went on to
mention another person implanted with the device on the "West Coast".
56. During the discussion stated in paragraph number fifty-five (55),
above this Defendant further mentioned the source of "device" as the
Central Intelligence Agency.
57. Plaintiff was subsequently transported to, and housed at the
Braintree Station.
58. On or about the 16th day of December 1996, Plaintiff was taken to
the Boston Massachusetts Federal Building and arraigned on Federal
criminal Charges before U.S. Magistrate Judge LAWRENCE COHEN.
59. Plaintiff was transported from the Boston Federal Building, to the
Wyatt detention facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island where he
remained housed.
60. On the 6th day of January 1997, Plaintiff was brought before the
Honorable Magistrate Judge JUDGE ROBERT B. COLLINGS, U.S. District
[**12] Court Judge, for the purpose of a Bond Hearing.
[*250] 61. During the Bond Hearing stated in paragraph number sixty
(60) above; Defendant FARLEY, testified that he heard the conversation
at Logan International Airport between Defendant Roberto, and the
Plaintiff in which Defendant ROBERTO, informed Plaintiff about the
Plaintiff being implanted with a "device" which monitored Plaintiff
activities.
62. Defendant FARLEY, further testified that it was his belief that
ROBERTO, was merely joking with the Plaintiff regarding the "device".
63. Upon adjournment of the January 6th Bond Hearing Plaintiff was
returned to the Central Falls Facility for housing.
64. On June 14, 1999, a hearing was conducted (without the presence of
Plaintiff) at the Federal Court Building Worcester, Massachusetts
before the Honorable NATHANIEL M. GORTON, U.S. District Court Judge,
at which time Judge GORTON, ordered Assistant U.S. Attorney's JEFFREY
AUERHAHN, and CYNTHIA YOUNG, to ascertain whether or not agent's
discussed a device being implanted in Plaintiff, and whether such
implantation did occur.
65. As a result of Judge [**13] GORTON'S, June 14th Court Order the
record reflects that certain Defendant's did in fact advise Plaintiff
that a device was implanted in him, however, these Defendants were
allegedly joking and there was no implantation of such device in
Plaintiff.
66. On the 25th day of May, 2000, the Honorable JOSEPH TAURO, United
States District Judge, ordered the government to cause to be affected
and M.R.I. on Plaintiff to conclusively ascertain the existence of any
electronic device implanted in the Plaintiff.
67. Judge TAURO's, May 25th Judicial order stated in paragraphs number
66 above, has to this date not been effectuated.
68. Plaintiff was under Federal/State investigation and surveillance,
and monitoring at the time of and prior to Plaintiff's admission at
Massachusetts General Hospital for gunshot wound.
69. As a product of discovery process conducted in a malpractice
lawsuit against Massachusetts general Hospital, et al. (Case No:
99-5655H), Plaintiff has procured conclusive medical evidence that
there did exist a foreign "artifact" inside Plaintiff at time of
x-rays conducted at Massachusetts General Hospital, as set forth in
paragraph [**14] numbers 36 and 37 above. This device remains inside
Plaintiff.
Docket No. 1 at 5-14.
The docket entries in United States v. Vincent Portalla, a.k.a.
Vincent Marino, Criminal No. 97-10026 for the dates referred to in
paragraphs 58, 60-62, and 66 of the complaint are reproduced in
Attachment A. The docket entries in United States v. Vincent Michael
Marino, a.k.a. Gigi Portalla, Criminal No. 97-40009 for the
proceedings of June 14, 1999, referred to in paragraphs 64 and 65 of
the complaint are also reproduced in Attachment A
III. Interpretation of Pro-Se Pleadings
This court has a duty to construe pro se submissions with liberality,
and does so in this case as in others. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,
9, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163, 101 S. Ct. 173 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 92 [*251] S. Ct. 594
(1972) (per curiam); see also Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 54
n. 5 (1st Cir.1993). For this reason, even though the complaint is
unclear in relation to the precise nature of the claims being
asserted, I treat the complaint as sufficient to give notice to the
defendants and the court [**15] that the plaintiff is making Bivens
claims against federal defendants, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619,
91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), and claims against state defendants remediable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IV. Verification of Pleadings
The court's obligation to accept alleged facts as true for the
purposes of rulings on a motion to dismiss is limited to well-pleaded
facts. Washington Legal Foundation, 993 F.2d at 971. Whether facts are
well-pleaded may depend on (1) the nature of those facts, (2) whether
reasonably expectable sources of verification are identified and, when
examined, do or do not verify the allegations, and (3) whether facts
that are well-pleaded identify reasons to expect that records and
witnesses who might verify allegations are accessible to a defendant
but not to the plaintiff. See, e.g., New England Data Servs., Inc. v.
Becher, 829 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1987).
The facts alleged in the complaint in this case include allegations
that multiple hearings were held before two magistrate judges and two
district judges of [**16] this court during which rulings were made.
The record now before the undersigned judge, however, does not include
docket entries, reporter transcripts, or memoranda and orders that
would either verify or show falsity of these allegations. Thus, on the
record now before me, I cannot determine whether many of these alleged
facts are well-pleaded facts.
For example, plaintiff asserts in paragraph 66 that Judge Tauro
ordered the government to cause to be affected and M.R.I. on Plaintiff
to conclusively ascertain the existence of any electronic device
implanted in the Plaintiff
on May 25, 2000. The record from plaintiff's criminal case, over which
Judge Tauro presided, does reflect that the plaintiff appeared before
Judge Tauro on that date, entered a guilty plea, and was sentenced.
Docket Nos. 102, 103, 104, and 106 in Criminal No. 97-10026. Nothing
in the record now before me suggests or refers to, even obliquely, any
statements by anyone at the hearing regarding an M.R.I. Therefore, I
cannot at this time determine that the allegations in paragraph 66 are
not well-pleaded. Also, I cannot determine whether the rule of
pleading explained in Becher does or does not apply. [**17]
V. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
The federal defendants in this case have filed two separate Motions to
Dismiss (Docket Nos. 21 and 72). The later motion was filed on behalf
of three defendants who were served after the first motion was filed.
Because the memoranda supporting the motions make identical
substantive arguments, I treat them together.
A chief contention of the federal defendants is that plaintiff filed
this suit after his claims were barred under the applicable statute of
limitation. The federal defendants also assert that the action against
them is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, that the
complaint fails to state a claim against them because it is cast as a
Section 1983 claim, and that the complaint should be dismissed as
frivolous.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts urges that the case against Lt.
Thomas Quigley in his official capacity be dismissed because it is a
claim for damages against [*252] the state that is barred by the
Commonwealth's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and that, in any
event, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
VI. More on the Claim Against the Federal Defendants
A. Failure to State [**18] a Claim
To the extent that the federal defendants seek dismissal because the
complaint is cast as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, their request
must be denied. As is noted above, pro se plaintiffs are not held to
the same strict standards of pleading that parties who are represented
by counsel are expected to meet. The court therefore treats the claims
against the federal defendants as Bivens claims and will not dismiss
this action merely because the complaint does not explicitly say that
plaintiff is asserting Bivens claims.
B. Frivolousness
The federal defendants characterize plaintiff's allegations as
"fantastic and delusional," and urge that the court dismiss the civil
action for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The cases cited by the federal defendants,
however, do not support the contention that a court has authority to
make such an order without a showing of grounds for concluding that no
reasonable adjudicator could credit enough of the allegations to
determine that a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
Bell v. Hood and its progeny arguably support a dismissal of federal
claims [**19] when those claims are patently frivolous as a matter of
law. 327 U.S. 678, 683, 66 S. Ct. 773, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946). In Bell,
however, the Court did not determine whether the alleged facts were
credible. Rather, noting that "if the allegations have any foundation
in truth, the plaintiffs' legal rights have been ruthlessly violated,"
the Court reversed the district court's dismissal. Id.
The case on which the federal defendants rely most stridently, Neitzke
v. Williams, is wholly inapplicable on this issue. 490 U.S. 319, 109
S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). In that case, the Court
interpreted the term "frivolous" as it appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
That section, which has since been amended in ways that are not
relevant here, allows a district court to dismiss a civil action in
which the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis whenever the court
determines that the action is frivolous. The civil docket sheet for
this civil action and the stamp placed on the Complaint by the office
of the Clerk of this court both indicate that the plaintiff paid the $
150.00 filing fee. Therefore, Section 1915 and Neitzke are
inapplicable here.
C. Sovereign Immunity of Federal Defendants [**20] Sued in their
Official Capacities
Actions brought against federal employees in their official capacities
are actions against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2679; Hawaii v.
Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 10 L. Ed. 2d 191, 83 S. Ct. 1052 (1963). Actions
against the United States are allowed only in the limited situations
where the United States has, by a specific statutory provision, waived
its immunity. Bivens actions, therefore, which do not arise under any
statute, may not be brought against the United States or its officials
acting in their official capacity. Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28
(1st Cir. 2000).
In limited circumstances, the United States has waived its immunity
with respect to the intentional torts of federal law enforcement
officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. That waiver, however, requires that a
claimant file a claim with the relevant federal agency within two
years after the claim has occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 2401; [*253] Roman
v. Townsend, 224 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2000). Only after such a claim
is denied may a claimant resort to a suit [**21] against the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 2675.
Plaintiff has not asserted that he filed a claim with the Drug
Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Central
Intelligence Agency, or any other federal entity. This failure
precludes this court from accepting this civil action as a suit for
damages against the United States and its officers in official
capacities.
Of course, the immunity of the United States does not preclude this
court from issuing an appropriate writ if one is required by the facts
of the case and applicable law, and does not preclude the maintenance
of a Bivens action against the federal officials in their individual
capacities. See Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000).
D. Timeliness
Ordinarily a federal court looks to the most closely analogous state
statute of limitation governing personal injury claims for guidance as
to the period of limitation to be applied to Bivens claims and Section
1983 claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254,
105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985) (Section 1983 claims); Roman v. Townsend, 224
F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) [**22] (Bivens actions). Massachusetts
has a three-year limitation period for personal injuries claims. Mass.
Gen. Laws c. 260, § 2A.
Even when the period of limitation is determined by analogy to state
law, the determination regarding the time of accrual of a cause of
action is governed by federal law. Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46,
52 (1st Cir. 2000). In this circuit, Bivens and Section 1983 claims
accrue at the moment the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of
the injury that is the basis for the claims. Id. See also Brackett v.
United States, 270 F.3d 60, 68 n.4 (1st Cir. 2001) ("in tort law under
the discovery rule, the running of the statute of limitations does not
begin until the fact of the injury becomes known, or should have
become known in the exercise of due diligence"). Federal courts may
adopt any state tolling rules that are not at odds with federal law.
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-486, 64 L. Ed. 2d 440,
100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980).
The federal defendants assert that plaintiff's claim accrued on
December 15, 1996, (more than two years before plaintiff initiated
this civil action) when Defendant [**23] Roberto informed plaintiff
that "a microchip tracking device" was implanted in plaintiff, and
requested plaintiff's authorization for its removal. The court,
however, cannot at the same time credit federal defendants' assertion
that plaintiff's claim about the planting of a "microchip tracking
device" is frivolous and credit federal defendants' assertion that at
the time of that incident plaintiff knew or should have known "the
fact of injury" to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff asserts that he is the victim of an on-going conspiracy and
that the statute of limitation, therefore, has not yet run. Docket No.
50 at 33-35. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that the statute
should be tolled because he is incarcerated in a federal penitentiary,
has limited access to legal materials, and, at least during the
pendency of his criminal case, was incarcerated in a facility that
provided no access whatsoever to legal materials. Id. at 35-36.
Finally, plaintiff argues that his cause of action did not accrue
until November 24, 1999, when he reviewed an x-ray film report. Id. at
73.
Another issue arises from the fact that the federal defendants, under
oath at the plaintiff's criminal trial, [**24] Docket No. 1 P62 &
65, repudiated the comments allegedly made on December 15, 1996. In
these [*254] circumstances, I cannot at this time determine whether
plaintiff is or is not entitled to the benefit of a doctrine of
equitable tolling that would stand in the way of dismissal of this
civil action. See Andrews v. Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co., 423 Mass.
1021, 1021, 673 N.E.2d 40, 41 (Mass. 1996).
VII. More on the Claims Against the State Defendant
The state defendant, Lt. Thomas Quigley, is sued in both his
individual and official capacities. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
moved to dismiss the claims brought against Lt. Quigley in his
official capacity only (Docket No. 18, filed June 12, 2001; Docket No.
77, filed November 7, 2001).
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is the real party in interest when a
state police officer is sued for damages in his official capacity.
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 112 S. Ct. 358
(1991). It is well-established that a state is not amenable to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a state is not a "person" within the
meaning of that statute. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). [**25] For
these reasons, the Order below DISMISSES the claims that seek monetary
damages against the Commonwealth and against Lt. Quigley in his
official capacity.
Although injunctive relief may be available against state officials
sued in their official capacities, see, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908), plaintiff's complaint fails
to state a viable claim for injunctive relief. The facts recited
above, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff do not
establish that Lt. Quigley is engaged in a continuing violation of
federal law. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S.
Ct. 1347 (1974). Injunctive relief, which is prospective in nature, is
not available to remedy past violations. Id. For these reasons, the
Order below DISMISSES claims for injunctive relief against Lt. Quigley
in his official capacity.
VIII. Plaintiff's Motions
A. Plaintiff's Motions for Disclosure and Production of Newly
Discovered Documents Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26 and Rule 34 (Docket No.
53, filed December 3, 2001; Docket No. 56, filed December 6, 2001; and
Docket No. 76, filed February 19, 2002)
In Docket [**26] Numbers 53 and 56, which are identical in all
respects, plaintiff seeks to place two documents into evidence. In
Docket Number 76, plaintiff seeks to place various testimony and other
exhibits into evidence. At the present time, no motion for summary
judgment is before this court. Also, plaintiff has not identified any
other pending matter as to which the testimony presented in Docket No.
76 would be appropriately received in evidence.
For these reasons, the Order below DENIES Docket Nos. 53, 56, and 76.
This ruling is without prejudice to the later filing of an appropriate
request in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment or to the introduction of this evidence for a legitimate
reason at trial or any other hearing.
B. Plaintiff's Motion of Disclosure and Production of Newly Discovered
Documents re: United States Patent Number: 5,629,678 of Human Implants
of Tracking Devices and Other State of the Art Capabilities. All Being
Disclosed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26 and Rule 34 (Docket No.
61, filed January 7, 2002)
As the caption above indicates, in Docket Number 61, plaintiff seeks
to place certain information related to various patents and inventions
[**27] into evidence. This information is not relevant to any issue
[*255] now before this court. For this reason, the Order below DENIES
Docket No. 61.
C. Motions to Clarify Medical Term "Artifact" (Docket Nos. 57, filed
December 20, 2001 and 62, filed January 10, 2002)
In Docket Numbers 57 and 62, which are identical in all respects,
plaintiff seeks to have the court clarify the term "artifact."
Plaintiff asserts that this term appears on at least one of his
medical records.
The definition of the term "artifact" in general is not decisive of
any issue now before the court. The meaning of that term as it appears
on plaintiff's medical record or records, however, may become
important in relation to a motion for summary judgment, at a trial on
the merits, or at an evidentiary hearing at which this evidence could
be received for a legitimate purpose.
For these reasons, the Order below DENIES Docket Nos. 57 and 62.
D. Motion to Offer Caselaw to Prohibit Defense Attorneys from
Protection of Defendants who Continue to Conspire Together in
Furtherance of Conspiracy and Conspiracy of Silence to Cover Up
Discovery (Docket No. 59, filed January 7, 2002)
The Order below DENIES Docket [**28] No. 59 as a Motion. The court
treats this pro-se submission as a memorandum of law, however and has
considered plaintiff's arguments of law presented in this document.
E. Motion of Notice via sharing an Attorney [AUSA Anita Johnson] with
Original Defendants and also via Identity of Interest with Originally
Named Defendants (Docket No. 60, filed January 7, 2002)
The Order below DISMISSES Docket No. 60 as moot in light of the
Statement of Defendant Regarding Service on Individuals (Docket No.
67, filed January 10, 2002) and the Declaration of Assistant U.S.
Attorney Regarding Service (Docket No. 68, filed January 10, 2002).
The Declaration indicates that the two named defendants have now been
served.
IX. Remaining Issues
In the order below, the defendants are directed to file their answer
or answers or other responsive pleadings no later than Monday, April
1, 2002.
Any party or attorney with knowledge of the x-ray and radiology report
referred to in P37 of the complaint and who asserts or may assert a
privilege with respect to those documents may file an application to
file the documents under seal.
In the Order below, any party receiving notice of this Order and
[**29] having custody of any documents, medical records, x-rays, or
other evidence related to the claims asserted in this civil action is
directed to preserve those items pending a further order of this
court.
All parties are directed to file a proposed schedule for the efficient
adjudication of this matter no later than April 15, 2002.
ORDER
For the reasons explained above, it is ORDERED:
(1) Federal Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docket No. 21, filed July
10, 2001 and Docket No. 72, filed February 7, 2002) are ALLOWED to the
extent that the complaint seeks damages from federal officials acting
in their official capacity, and are otherwise DENIED;
(2) Thomas Quigley's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 77, filed November
7, 2001) is ALLOWED to the extent that it seeks a dismissal of the
case against Lt. Quigley in his official capacity, and is otherwise
DENIED;
[*256] (3) Plaintiff's Motions for Disclosure and Production of
Newly Discovered Documents Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 26 and Rule 34
(Docket No. 53, filed December 3, 2001 and Docket No. 56, filed
December 6, 2001) are DENIED;
(4) Plaintiff's Motion of Newly Discovered Evidence Offered Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26 and Rule [**30] 34 (Docket No. 76, filed
February 19, 2002) is DENIED;
(5) Plaintiff's Disclosure and Production of Newly Discovered
Documents (Docket No. 61, filed January 7, 2002) is DENIED;
(6) Plaintiff's Motions to Clarify Medical Term Artifact (Docket No.
57, filed December 20, 2001 and Docket No. 62, filed January 10, 2002)
are DENIED;
(7) Plaintiff's Motion to Offer Caselaw to Prohibit Defense Attorneys
from Protection of Defendants who Continue to Conspire Together in
Furtherance of Conspiracy and Conspiracy of Silence to Cover Up
Discovery (Docket No. 59, filed January 7, 2002) is DENIED;
(8) Plaintiff's Notice via Sharing an Attorney with Original
Defendants and Also via Identify of Interest with Originally Named
Defendants (Docket No. 60, filed January 7, 2002) is DISMISSED as
moot;
(9) Any party receiving notice of this Order and having custody of any
documents, medical records, x-rays, or other evidence related to the
claims asserted in this civil action is directed to preserve those
items pending a further order of this court
(10) All defendants are directed to file their answer or answers or
other responsive pleadings no later than Monday, April 1, 2002. All
parties are directed [**31] to file a proposed schedule for the
efficient adjudication of this matter no later than April 15, 2002.
Robert E. Keeton
United States District Judge
Attachment A
Reproduction of Docket Entries in United States v. Vincent Portalla,
a.k.a. Gigi, a.k.a. Vincent Marino, Criminal No. 97-10026, for the
dates identified in the Complaint in Civil Action No. 01-10116-REKDate
Docket # Docket Entry
12/16/96 3 MOTION by USA as to Vincent Portalla, Charles McConnell to
unseal the Complaint, supporting Affidavit, filed.
[1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 -- Mag. Judge Lawrence P. Cohen. ENDORSED ORDER as to Vincent
Portalla, Charles McConnell: granting [3-1] motion to
unseal the Complaint, supporting Affidavit as to Vincent
Portalla (1). [1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 -- Initial appearance as to Vincent Portalla, Charles
McConnell held (Defendant informed of rights.).
[1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 -- MOTION made in open court by USA as to Vincent Portalla,
Charles McConnell, for detention, to continue.
[1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 -- Mag. Judge Lawrence P. Cohen. ORAL ORDER as to Vincent
Portalla, Charles McConnell granting [0-0] oral motion to
continue as to Vincent Portalla (1), Charles McConnell (2).
[1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
12/16/96 4 Mag. Judge Lawrence P. Cohen. CLERK'S NOTES as to Vincent
Portalla re: Initial Appearance; set Detention Hearing for
2:00 p.m. on 12/18/96 for Vincent Portalla Court Reporter:
TAPE [1:96-m-171] (ktb) [Entry date 12/27/96]
. . .
01/06/97 -- Preliminary Examination as to Vincent Portalla held.
[1:96-m-171] (jam) [Entry date 01/09/97]
01/06/97 15 Mag. Judge Robert B. Collings for Mag. Judge
Cohen. CLERK'S NOTES as to Vincent Portalla, re:
Preliminary Exam. and Evidentiary Hearing held. Probable
cause found. Detention taken under advisement.; Court
Reporter: Tape [1:96-m-171] (jam) [Entry
date 01/09/97]
01/06/97 16 NOTICE of Appearance of counsel for Vincent Portalla, by
Attorney Robert L. Sheketoff. [1:96-m-171] (jam)
[Entry date 01/09/97]
01/06/97 17 Exhibit list by USA as to Vincent Portalla, filed.
[1:96-m-171] (jam) [Entry date 01/09/97]
05/25/00 -- Change of Plea Hearing as to Vincent Portalla held. (cmg)
[Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 -- PLEA entered by Vincent Portalla. Court accepts plea.
Guilty: Vincent Portalla (1) count(s) 4s (cmg)
[Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 102 Judge Joseph L. Tauro. CLERK'S NOTES as to Vincent
Portalla, re: change of plea. Deft present w/counsel for
change of plea. Court conducts plea colloquy. Deft enters
plea of guilty to Count 4. Counts 1,2,3 and 5 to be
dismissed by Govt upon sentencing. Govt's factual basis for
plea. Court accepts plea. Disposition immediately to be
concurrent w/D.J. Gorton sentence. P.S.R. is not completed.
Court Reporter: Teri Gibson (cmg) [Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 -- Sentencing held Vincent Portalla (1) count(s) 4s. (cmg)
[Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 103 Judge Joseph L. Tauro. CLERK'S NOTES as to Vincent
Portalla, re: sentencing. AT request of deft and Govt's
attorney, Court proceeds to sentencing phase. Joint
recommendation of parties is adopted by the Court and
imposed as follows: 10 years custody Atty. Gen. on Count 4
to be served currently w/CR 97-40009, 10.3 years Supervised
Release. No Fine. $ 100 special assessment. Court
recommends that deft serve his sentence as close to
Massachusetts as possible. Court Reporter: Teri Gibson
(cmg) [Entry date 06/01/00]
05/25/00 104 Plea Agreement as to Vincent Portalla, Marked as Exhibit
I,
FILED.(c/s) (cmg) [Entry date 06/01/00]
[**32]
[*257] Reproduction of Docket Entries in United States v. Vincent
Michael Marino, Criminal No. 97-40009, for the dates identified in the
Complaint in Civil Action No. 01-10116-REKDate Docket # Docket Entry
06/14/99 -- Status conference as to Robert F. Carrozza, Michael P.
Romano Sr., Anthony Ciampi, John J. Patti III, Eugene A.
Rida Jr., Vincent Michael Marino and Nazzaro Ralph Scarpa
held. (jb) [Entry date 06/23/99]
06/14/99 903 Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton. CLERK'S NOTES as to Robert F.
Carrozza, Michael P. Romano Sr., Anthony Ciampi, John J.
Patti III, Eugene A. Rida Jr., Vincent Michael Marino,
Nazzaro Ralph Scarpa, re: status conference; case called;
counsel and defendant Carrozza pro-se appear for status
conference. Hearing held on motions. Motion # 843, 861, 869
and 876 DENIED. Motions # 844, 858, 870 879 and 881
ALLOWED. Final status conference set for 9/8/99 at 3:30 pm.
set final status conference for 3:30 pm on 9/8/99 for
Robert F. Carrozza, for Michael P. Romano Sr., for Anthony
Ciampi, for John J. III, for Eugene A. Rida Jr., for
Vincent Michael Marino, Nazzaro Ralph Scarpa; Court
Reporter: C. Dahlstrom. (jb) [Entry date 06/23/99]
[**33]
http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/336028/title/Future_wars_may_be_fought_by_synapses
Instead of the indiscriminate destruction of the atom bomb or napalm, the signature weapon of future wars may be precise, unprecedented control over the human brain. As global conflicts become murkier, technologies based on infiltrating brains may soon enter countries’ arsenals, neuroethicists claim in a paper published online October 31 in Synesis. Such “neuroweapons” have the capacity to profoundly change the way war is fought.
Advances in understanding the brain’s inner workings could lead to a pill that makes prisoners talk, deadly toxins that can shut down brain function in minutes, or supersoldiers who rely on brain chips to quickly lock in on an enemy’s location.
The breadth of brain-based technologies is wide, and includes the traditional psychological tactics used in earlier wars. But the capacity of the emerging technologies is vastly wider — and may make it possible to coerce enemy minds with exquisite precision.
In the paper, neuroscientists James Giordano of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, Va., and Rachel Wurzman of Georgetown University Medical Center in Washington, D.C., describe emerging brain technologies and argue that the United States must be proactive in neuroscience-based research that could be used for national intelligence and security.
“A number of these different approaches are heating up in the crucible of possibility, so that’s really increased some of the momentum and the potential of what this stuff can do,” Giordano says.
In the not-too-distant future, technologies called brain-machine interfaces could allow the combination of human brains with sophisticated computer programs. Analysts with a brain chip could quickly sift through huge amounts of intelligence data, and fighter pilots merged with computer search algorithms could rapidly lock onto an enemy target, for instance.
Neuroscience could also find its way into interrogation rooms: As scientists learn more about how the brain generates feelings of trust, drugs could be developed that inspire that emotion in prisoners and detainees. Oxytocin, a hormone produced by mothers’ bodies after childbirth, is one such candidate. Perhaps a whiff of oxytocin could dampen a person’s executive functions, turning an uncooperative detainee into a chatty friend.
Other sorts of psychopharmacological manipulation could be used to boost soldiers’ performance, allowing them to remain vigilant without sleep, heighten their perceptual powers and erase memories of their actions on the battlefield. Because neuroscientists are beginning to understand how the brain forms memories, it’s not inconceivable that a drug could be designed to prevent PTSD. Such technology could enable more sinister applications, though, such as creating soldiers who wouldn’t remember atrocities they committed or detainees who couldn’t recall their own torture.
Some of these abilities are more probable than others, says bioethicist Jonathan Moreno of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. Drugs exist that increase alertness, but so far no drug has clearly boosted brain function. “Honestly, there isn’t much, compared to caffeine or nicotine,” he says.
Giordano and Wurzman also describe drugs, microbial agents and toxins derived from nature that could harm enemy brains in a more traditional way. The list includes a neurotoxin from a shellfish that is water soluble, able to be aerosolized and causes death within minutes; a bacterium that can induce hallucinations, itchiness and strange tastes; and an amoebic microbe that crawls up the olfactory nerve to invade the brain, where it kills brain tissue.
“The article contains an arsenal of neuroweapons, and these raise lots of ethical and legal issues,” says bioethicist Jonathan Marks of Pennsylvania State University in University Park. “Any kind of drug that you administer for national security purposes raises profound questions.”
Some scientists have already committed to resisting the application of their research to what they consider illegal or immoral military purposes. “It’s not enough just to study the issue of ethics,” says Curtis Bell of Oregon Health & Science University in Portland. “The potential for misuse of this knowledge is so strong that the responsibility of neuroscience goes further than just studying.”
Bell has circulated a petition for neuroscientists, pledging signatories not to participate in developing technology that will be knowingly used for immoral or illegal purposes. “Neuroscientists should not provide tools for torture,” he says. So far, about 200 neuroscientists from 18 countries have signed, he says.
Ideally science would have no place in combat, Giordano acknowledges, but that view ignores reality. “On one hand, what you’d like to say is science and technology should never be used to do bad things,” says Giordano, who also holds positions at the University of New Mexico and the University of Oxford in England. “Yeah, and Santa Claus should come at Christmas and the Easter Bunny should come at Easter, and we should all live happily. History teaches us otherwise, so we have to be realistic about this.”
The United States military is investing in brain-related research, though it’s difficult to get a solid estimate of how much research is happening, Moreno says. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, lists several neuroscience-related projects on its website, including “Accelerated Learning,” “Neurotechnology for Intelligence Analysts” and “Cognitive Technology Threat Warning System.”
“The fact of the matter is that we do live in a world in which there are people who would like to do bad things to us or our friends,” Moreno says. “Eventually, some of this stuff is going to be out there.”
http://www.pcworld.com.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=5664
人脑芯片5年内研制成功 瘫痪者有望痊愈 
人脑芯片
据英国媒体21日报道，瘫痪病人也许有一天可以行动自如，只不过他们需要一枚大脑芯片和受其控制的假肢。
配副假肢就可活动
英国科学家最近正在研发一种芯片，它只有一厘米宽，当人类想要做出某个动作时芯片上的电极会迅速接收神经冲动信号，通过数据处理技术来分析大脑神经运动，破译人们的想法，最终无线发射器会将信息从大脑里传出，发送给与芯片匹配的假肢。
科学家解释说，因骨髓受损而瘫痪的病人只是四肢无法移动，但他们的大脑没有问题。“他们知道自己想看什么，想做什么，只是受损的脊髓组织破坏了大脑信号的传播。如果我们可以将这些信号收集起来并进行破译，那么患者只需要再来一副假肢就可以活动了。”
5年内研制成功
类似的芯片技术已经在猴子身上做过实验，但那时使用的是有线传送，在猴子的颅骨上钻个孔。显然这种技术不适用于人类，既不美观也会有感染的风险。
科学家相信，五年内这种无线人脑芯片便可研制成功。到时，因脊髓组织受损而瘫痪的病人便有望重新正常运动。
http://www.36kr.com/p/41042.html
蓝色巨人IBM今天宣布他们已与四所大学和研究机构DARPA合作完成了一款革命性电脑芯片的基本设计，该芯片将被用来模拟大脑处理信息的方式——即具备感知，互动和识别等各种能力。
DARPA的首席研究员和IBM Almaden研究中心的研究员Dharmendra Modha就说：“它是新一代计算机的种子，而新一代计算机将结合超级计算，神经科学和纳米技术”。如果该人脑模拟芯片最终可以实现商业化生产，那么它将颠覆传统的计算形式，转而以更加具备思考能力的人造大脑的形式代替。其最终的应用将对商业，科学和政府产生巨大影响。
现在，研究人员已完成该项目的第一阶段，也就是设计一个可以不断被复制的基本计算单元，从而最终形成模拟人脑计算机的基本架构。这种新的计算单元（或者称为核心）主要模拟人的大脑。 它不仅能通过“神经元”或数字处理器来计算信息，也有人脑学习和记忆的基础“突触”。此外它还有连接计算机组织的“轴突”或数据通路。
虽然概念听起来很简单，但是该计算单元与现今大多数计算机的运行方式截然不同。 现代计算机主要基于冯诺依曼架构，内存和处理器是分开的，并通过总线作为数据通路连接。在过去的65年，冯诺依曼式计算机已经进化得越来越快了，也能以更高的速度通过总线发送更多的数据。但由于一台计算机的速度往往被总线的容量所限制，导致出现了“冯诺依曼瓶颈。”
而模拟人脑的芯片则不同，内存包含在芯片里面。虽然运行不是很快，发送的数据也只有10赫兹，远远慢于今天的5千兆赫计算机处理器。但是在类似大脑的平行架构内，它能处理很多工作，向各个方向发送信号，让大脑的神经元同时工作。 而大脑的10亿个神经元和10万亿个连接（突触）加在一起就能形成强大的计算能力了。
IBM就希望效仿这一大脑结构创建全新的芯片。
该研究小组目前已建立起第一批类似人脑的计算单元，由256个神经元，256×256个突触和256个轴突构成。 换句话说，它已经拥有了处理器，内存和通信的基本架构。 此外这种类人脑结构还有另一个好处，运行功耗低，而且在不使用时还可以实现部分关闭。另外这些新的芯片将不会以传统的方式进行编程。 基于它的认知计算机也有望实现学习经验，寻找相关性，建立假设，记住和学习等能力。 由于他们模仿大脑的“结构和突触可塑性”，因而处理过程是分布式和平行式的，而非集中和串行式。
另外这种计算机芯片还能重新创建一种类似大脑中发生在神经元和突触之间的“脉冲”现象。 因而其能够处理十分复杂的任务，比如玩Pong游戏。目前已有两个原型芯片被制造出来正在测试。研究人员也即将步入到第2个阶段，创建一个计算机。 目标是创建一个不仅能立刻通过多种感官分析复杂信息，而且能动态修正自身，与环境互动和识别周围发生的事情的计算机。
另外除了玩Pong游戏，IBM的团队还测试过该芯片解决导航，机器视觉，模式识别，联想记忆以及分类等问题的能力。最终，IBM将把该计算单元完全融入到一个完整的硬件和软件的集成系统中去。 Modha说，IBM希望建立一台包含100亿个神经元和100万亿个突触的计算机。这比人类大脑的功都强大10倍以上。 另外Modha还预测，完整的系统只会消耗一千瓦的功率，而且将占据不到两升的量（我们大脑的大小）。 相比之下，目前最快的IBM超级计算机蓝色基因有147,456处理器，内存容量超过144T，有一个巨大的空调柜那么大，消耗超过2兆瓦的电力。
对于具体应用方面，IBM说可以使用认知计算机通过传感器网络和微型电机网络不断记录和报告数据如温度，压力，波高，声学和海潮等来监测世界范围内的供水状况。 然后，它还可以在发生地震的情况下发出海啸警报。而这样的任务传统计算机根本不可能完成。
据悉，该项目是用DARPA捐赠的2100万美元创建的，包括六个IBM实验室，四所大学（康乃尔大学，威斯康星大学，加州大学和哥伦比亚大学）以及一些政府研究人员。虽然这个项目比较新，但是IBM自其1956年创建第一台人脑模拟器（512个神经元）以来就一直在从事对类人脑计算机的研究 。
Modha就说：“如果一切顺利，这将不是5％的飞跃。而是一个巨大的飞跃。 而且到现在为止我们也已经克服了巨大的能够想象到的困难。”
期待类人脑计算机时代的到来吧！
http://tech.sina.com.cn/b/2011-11-01/03471919574.shtml
IBM蓝色基因计划 88万CPU完全模拟人脑
【PConline 资讯】近日关于苹果的个人语音助理Siri的话题不少，对着Siri说说“I Love You”果粉不计其数，人工智能是否真的可以达到人机互恋的程度暂且不提，至少现在模拟大脑是目前CPU研究的一个方向。关于人工智能的研究，不能不提到IBM，年初的人机大战已经让世界领略到Waston的智能水平，近日国外媒体媒体传出消息，按照目前的进度，IBM蓝色基因计划将于2019年左右完全模拟人类电脑，届时IBM将用约88万个CPU完全模拟人类大脑，对比说来，Siri只能算是小儿科了。
IBM蓝色基因模拟人脑
届时，各种在科幻小说电影里面的机器也能谈恋爱的场景是否会变为现实，值得拭目以待，Siri也只能算是小儿科产品了。Siri只是依靠强大的数据中心和语音识别配以实时搜索功能，甚至有笑话“印度云”秒速Siri背后是一大堆苹果员工在回复iPhone用户。而IBM蓝色基因计划将是让机器用与人类一样的思考方式运作，而且拥有自我学习和创作能力。
认知计算机技术
早在2008年11月，IBM就传出消息，IBM公司将领导一项由政府资助的联合项目，该研制计划可以模拟人类大脑的电子线路。该研究领域的主要一个部分是“认知计算机技术”，研究将有赖神经生物学家、计算机和材料科学家以及心理学家的通力合作。
领导该项目的IBM科学家达门德·莫哈说：“大脑具有一种惊人的将跨意识的多重含义信息整合能力，它可以毫不费力的创建时间、空间和物体的种类，以及得出感官数据的相互关系。大脑可以完成各种无与伦比的技艺，令现在的计算机望尘莫及。”
“认知计算机技术”隶属于IBM认知计算（Cognitive Cumputing）研究项目，通过内存模仿突触、通信模仿轴突、计算模仿神经元的方式，IBM能够让这种芯片模仿人类的大脑工作。John E.Kelly表示通过这种仿生学芯片IBM的仿生学计算机在未来能够模拟20亿个人脑的神经元并实现对认知计算的初步完成，这种仿生学计算机将会是计算技术未来发展的一个重要方向。
IBM认知计算（Cognitive Cumputing）研究项目
到2009年，关于模拟人类大脑的蓝色基因计划正式公布，并在2009年获得美国国家科技创新奖章，当时IBM用147456个Power系列处理器模拟一只猫的大脑。IBM的研究人员建立了猫的大脑皮层模拟机构，其中包括10亿脑细胞和10兆认知神经元突触，信息的传递和连接就在这些神经元中间进行。这具猫脑数字模型的运行速度目前只相当于真猫大脑实际运行速度的1/100。
蓝色基因模拟超新星
除了模拟人类大脑外，2010年4月IBM还用蓝色基因超级电脑模拟出了超新星爆发的极端物理过程。
蓝色基因
在本月中旬，IBM研究主管John E.Kelly在墨尔本大学接受采访时表示，IBM目前正在研发的新型仿生芯片，可以模仿人类大脑的运算并能够实现学习和记忆，同时可以触类旁通并实现对知识的创造，这种具有创新能力的设计将会让电脑拥有自我学习和创造的能力。
IBM人类仿生芯片
随着技术的发展与进步，模拟猫脑需要CPU数量已经从当时的147456个缩减为24576个。而147456个Power系列处理器目前已经可以模拟出4.5%的人类大脑。完全模拟人类大脑需要88万个CPU，按照目前的研究进度，蓝色基因计划最快可与8年内完成，即2019年完全模拟出人类大脑。[返回频道首页]
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http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-11/14/c_122276006.htm
【美国《科学新闻》周刊网站11月11日文章】题：神经键或许成为未来战争武器(作者劳拉·桑德斯)
与原子弹或燃烧弹不加区分的破坏不同，未来战争的标志性武器或许是对人脑的精准和前所未有的控制。神经伦理学家在《科学法则》半年刊网站10月31日发表的一篇论文中说，随着全球冲突变得越来越界定模糊，基于大脑渗透的技术没准很快就将进入各国的武器库。这种“神经武器”将有可能极大地改变战争的方式。
随着对大脑工作原理的进一步了解，可能会研发出一种让囚犯招供的药丸、能够在几分钟内让大脑“停摆”的致命毒素，或是依赖大脑芯片来迅速锁定敌人位置的超级战士。
基于人脑的技术多种多样，其中包括较早时期的战争中使用的传统心理战术。但是新技术的能量则大得多——而且或许能极为准确地操控敌人的心智。
在论文中，两位神经科学家——位于弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿的波托马克政策研究所的詹姆斯·乔达诺和位于华盛顿特区的乔治敦大学医学中心的蕾切尔·沃泽曼——介绍了新兴的大脑技术。他们说，美国必须在基于神经科学的、可以用于国家情报和安全领域的研究中抢占先机。
在不太遥远的未来，名为“人脑-机器接口”的技术可能会把人脑与尖端的计算机程序结合起来。比如，装有一枚大脑芯片的分析师将能够很快地完成海量情报数据的筛选，而与计算机搜索算法融为一体的战斗机飞行员将能够迅速锁定敌方目标。
神经科学同样可以应用在审讯室中：随着科学家越来越了解大脑产生信任感的机理，研究人员将可能研制出激发囚犯和被拘留者信任感的药物。催产素(女性生育后体内产生的一种荷尔蒙)就是一个备选项。没准一点点催产素就能瓦解一个人的自控能力，把一个不合作的囚犯变成一个健谈的朋友。
其他类型的精神药理学操控技术能够用来提升士兵的战斗力，让他们不用睡觉就能保持警醒、增强他们的感知能力，并清除掉他们对自己在战场上所作所为的记忆。由于神经科学家正开始搞清楚大脑记忆的形成机理，因此研制一种可以预防创伤后应激障碍的药物并非不可思议。不过，这种技术可能会用在比较邪恶的事情上，比如“制造”不会记住所犯暴行的士兵，或是不能记起所受刑讯折磨的囚犯。
宾夕法尼亚大学生物伦理学家乔纳森·莫雷诺说，上述能力中的其中一些比另外一些更可能实现。提高警觉度的药物是存在的，但是到目前为止，还没有药物能明显促进大脑的功能。
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1138042/1/.html
SINGAPORE: A Danish national has filed a writ against Alexandra Hospital (AH) for allegedly planting a microchip in him during a 1988 operation, which he claimed later caused him mental distress due to being constantly monitored.
According to court papers filed in the High Court on June 21 against AH, which has been managed by Jurong Health Services since August last year, Mr Mogens Tindhof Honore said he first found a metal instrument akin to a microchip in his left lung after an X-ray scan in 1997.
Mr Honore, 54, added the metal piece was implanted in him during an operation at AH more than two decades ago - the last time he had undergone surgery in his chest and lung.
Represented by lawyer Oliver Quek, the former seaman said that he was stabbed in the lung in May 1988. After his discharge, he kept hearing voices in his head and could not lead a normal life. He would also feel generally unwell and would even cough out blood.
"(Mr Honore) also discovered and experienced that strange people on the streets would approach and speak to (him) about strange subject matters or pass strange irrelevant comments," according to the papers filed.
Mr Honore said that his subsequent discovery of being constantly tracked left him in a "perpetual state of apprehension and fear for the safety of his life". It also prevented him from holding on to a job.
When he returned to Singapore in December last year to investigate his condition, he claimed that he was turned away by AH which said it had no records of his stay.
He claimed that two X-ray scans later on May 9 this year at AH and Mount Elizabeth Hospital found the metal fragment (microchip) in his left chest wall instead of his left lung.
He also claimed that, earlier this month, he underwent an operation at Mount Elizabeth Hospital to remove the fragment.
In his lawsuit, Mr Honore is now alleging that employees of AH who had then operated on him implanted the microchip in him intentionally, causing "exceptional harm and lifelong suffering". He also said that the alleged act constitutes a trespass on his body.
Mr Honore claims that he suffers from various conditions following the alleged act, such as impairment of relationship, loss of enjoyment of life and suicidal thoughts.
Seeking damages for expenses incurred such as psychiatric help and medication, he is also alleging that AH medical staff who tended to him were negligent.
He said that the staff was careless in placing a metal fragment in his left chest wall during the operation, resulting in harm and injury.
Responding to media queries, AH director of communications and service quality Casey Chang said: "We understand that the patient had recently returned to Alexandra Hospital to seek information regarding medical treatment he had received at Alexandra Hospital in May 1988. This was 23 years ago when Alexandra Hospital was a government hospital."
She added that, after the hospital was informed of the lawsuit, AH has taken steps to convey to the patient's lawyer (Mr Quek) that Jurong Health Services Pte Ltd has been wrongly identified as the defendant in the suit.
At the time Mr Honore was treated in AH in 1988, the hospital was under the Ministry of Health.
I feel like i went to sleep and woke up in a different world. People used to be kind and friendly now the world is so hostile. Thank God this thing is open enough we have found each other, must have been pretty lonely for the first TI's who had no communication.
What do you do to stop from feeling so alone in this strange world??
1) 你爱加拿大吗？
2）你在中国，参加过军队吗？
3）你会使用武器吗？
4）在大街上，你如何发现有人跟踪你？
http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0610/15/15083_126016132.shtml
http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2007-06/23/content_6281284.htm
http://www.sina.com.cn 2007年06月24日08:30 荆楚网-楚天金报
据新华社电 美国中央情报局(CIA）即将解密一份有“家丑”之称的档案，这份文件详述CIA在上世纪50至70年代的违法活动，包括暗杀计划、非法窃听和人体试验等。CIA甚至还拆阅美国与中国、苏联之间的往来信件。
“水门事件”后查家丑
CIA局长海登21日宣布，已决定解密这份素有“传家宝”之称的“家丑”汇编。CIA发言人利特尔同日表示，档案的解密版本最早将于下周发布在CIA网站上。
这份文件成于1973年，全长693页，由时任CIA副局长科尔比按照局长施莱辛格的命令汇编而成。据披露，1972年“水门事件”后，施莱辛格发现，闯入水门大厦的5名男子中，有两人不仅是CIA资深官员，还与CIA内部串通行动。他遂于1973年5月初下令，要求CIA高官立即报告所有可能超出权限的活动，从而形成这份“家丑”汇编。
30多年来讳莫如深
美国《纽约时报》1974年曾报道，CIA有这么一份记录了自身许多非法活动的材料汇编。此后30多年来，许多团体依据《新闻自由法》，多次要求CIA解密这份文件，但除了遭到严格审查的几十页内容得以公布外，CIA对于这份“传家宝”一直讳莫如深。上世纪90年代，CIA承诺更加开放，但后来的局长特尼特非常保守，使解密工作陷于停顿。
CIA发言人利特尔说，鉴于档案中的部分内容与当前情报工作有关，解密版本“仍将有所删节”。
不太光彩却是历史
据21日公布的备忘录，科尔比当年向司法部通报时列举了CIA18项具体行动，其中包括拘禁一名苏联叛逃人员、非法闯入前CIA雇员住宅、搜集近万名反战人士资料、秘密对民众开展人体试药等。
CIA还非法监控跟踪，例如1963年窃听两名专栏作家的电话、1972年监视普利策奖得主杰克·安德。还截走4封寄给反战人士、影星简·方达的信件。
根据备忘录，CIA曾阴谋刺杀古巴领导人卡斯特罗、前刚果（金）领导人卢蒙巴等人。还曾于1953年至1973年间检查美国与苏联之间的来往信件，于1969年至1972年间检查美国与中国之间的来往信件。
海登21日谈及“家丑档案”时说，“大部分内容不太光彩，但那是CIA的历史。”
